e-Soldiers;
Canadian Military Human Resources Facing the 21st Century Challenges

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e-Soldiers;

Change Catalyst

"Information age technologies have caused a Revolution in Military Affairs; the claim is almost trite[1]". But military planners have sometimes been slow to recognise, the procurement process slow to exploit, opportunities offered by advances in new technology[2]. Furthermore, the RMA impacts upon and imposes organisational adaptation, doctrinal innovation and cultural evolution[3], both vertically and horizontally, beyond the technology. **Paradoxically, the key to the success of digitisation will not be technology! It will be our willingness to evolve in order to employ technologies to their maximum effectiveness[4]. Facing the challenges of the future security environment[5], our soldiers, not technology, are key!** The private sector recognizes that the competitive edge is achieved not with technology alone, but with the appropriate organizational structure and culture to optimize technologies. The greatest implications of the future have less to do with technology, than with changing socio-organisational structure and cultures. In essence, this is where the present transformational focus is lacking, with regard to adapting HR paradigms. Defence "is not well positioned, from a management perspective, to meet its strategic-level challenges[6]". This is especially true with regard to how the CF manages its Soldiers; they constitute our best weapon.

As Canada saluted the passing away of 'Smokey' Smith, its last World War II Victoria Cross Warrior, an important page of this Nation's history turned. "For Canada, it is (now) time to awake and seize the day[7]". "The old Canada is gone[8]" and the new Canada must emerge, or our Nation simply risks falling behind[9]! Consequently, our Military also needs to awake from its past glories: "We were Soldiers[10]", as it goes... Thus, the Military Human Resources (Mil-HR) system is outdated. Simply put; it has become obsolete. It is anchoring transformation efforts in place. It is hampering our Forces' evolution by promoting old ways. Indeed, Mil-HR policies are essentially the pegs that hold the entire institution firmly rooted in place[11], while real transformation is one that takes root in the minds of those participating in the change process[12]. For Machiavelli, a policy is defined not by its excellence but by its outcome; if it isn't effective, it can't be virtuous[13]. As such, in keeping with the HR-Mil vision of: "Looking after our people, investing in them and giving them confidence in the future[14]", **we will argue: rhetoric is omnipresent, but that effects are lacking**. We will propose practical ways, tangible & intangible, to revitalise the CF Soldier System. In the current CF transformation efforts, the entire soldier life cycle must be fundamentally adapted.

Asymmetric Warfare

The key to asymmetric warfare, where opportunities become threats and vice versa[15], is simple: It is the asymmetric antagonists' *ability to adapt* to constant change, to mutate into opportunistic threats. Without this *ability to adapt*, employing the next generation of opportunities to their advantage, our future antagonists would likely become obsolete and then fall victim to our own capacity to seize the initiative[16]. In essence, all future protagonists' centre of gravity will truly lie 3 inches between their two eyes & ears. This has more to do with the *abilities or People* part of the capabilities equation (capacities x abilities), but paradoxically, CF transformation focuses much more on platforms than on people, only to say that the CF will expand its Regular Force by 5000 and its Reserve Force by 3000, as directed in the recent DPS[17]. Although quantity does have a quality of its own, asymmetric warfare is more about *leveraging abilities*. As such, the DPS states that: "Transformation is not just about technology & equipment modernization". Indeed: "It will require fundamental change to the culture of our military to ensure a fully integrated and unified approach to operations", but beyond force structure, to how the CF really manages its own people.

In this potentially dangerous and chaotic security environment, "complacency can be lethal for Canada[18]". So, "if we are going to defeat the multitude of threats that face us in the new millennium, we are going to have to slay some sacred cows and this will take some serious debate. Success will lie in how we think[19]". Thinking asymmetrically, we must strategically address our own weaknesses. As such, strategists must shift paradigm to find and fix internal foes: "The ultimate goal is to ensure a more Relevant, Responsive and Effective CF, capable of operating in the dangerous and complex World of the 21st Century[20]"…

"It is much easier to Find & Fix an external Foe, than to Find & Fix any internal one"

Changing Paradigms

As we witness global changes in economics, politics, technology and the environment, the only sphere of humanity that is literally lagging behind is the social context or more specifically, human interactions. Indeed, all sciences are evolving at tremendous speeds, all but sociology and psychology, which are still largely based on the foundations laid out until the 1970's by characters like Pavlov (Nobel 1904) and his salivating dogs, Maslow (1968) and his hierarchy of needs, and Skinner (1971) and his laboratory rats. Today, these behavioural and cognitive theories still largely reflect the practices of modern psychology. In a way, they unconsciously lock our minds within their limits; restricting people's thinking on people. The very emergence of the industrial relations and human resources fields, were directly related to the birth of Taylorism, which, misinterpreted, led to abuses in the systemisation and mechanisation of work. Today however, networks and knowledge management offer new paradigms for how we manage people: For the first time in the history of management, it is the human mind that is the primary creator of value[21].

"The Empires of the Future are the Empires of the Mind"
Winston Churchill, Harvard Speech, September 6, 1943

However: "One needs only to read the newspapers, listen to the radio, watch television, or travel to realize that there has been no corresponding revolution in the human heart or in human affairs[22]". ***This is crucial***! Thus, the next battlefield or battlespace is neither field nor space, but brain, as humans conceive warfare. Conversely, war is a human venture, but the military's focus is much more on platforms than on people. **Rightly, DND's new knowledge management paradigm is that the intellectual capacity/ability of CF members is one of the most effective means Canada has to meet security environment challenges[23].** Indeed: "Managing knowledge…is now recognized to be more about People – Leadership and Culture[24]". Furthermore, militaries stand or fall according to their ability to maintain and reinforce military culture[25]. But the CF has only recently published its first ethos[26] and its first comprehensive leadership doctrine[27]. There is still much more thinking to be done about the *abilities or people* part of the capabilities equation, and it is critical: "The *ability* to respond to the needs of Canadians is at the centre of CF transformation[28]". Clearly, it will take extraordinary and out-of-the-box solutions to revive the Mil-HR or *e*-Soldiers system.

"Imagination is more important than knowledge", Einstein

e-Soldiers' Abilities

Many analysts neglect the most important part of the capabilities equation, overseeing the abilities: "The twin requirements for Money and Time, lead to a further aspect of Capability: Capacity. Money and time are necessary ingredients, but they alone are insufficient in a world of finite resources. So, priorities must be set and choices made[29]". But who gets to leverage those capacities and effectively employ them? How are they effectively employed and to what end? And how efficiently are these capacities integrated? **The answer is people, through their *abilities*. Thus, fundamental analysis dictates a Mil-HR Review.**

Indeed, as change catalyst, traditional assumptions in the Mil-HR field need to be challenged and adapted. To state that: "The two inescapable ingredients of Defence Transformation are Money and Time[30]" is an over simplification of the idea that *people are our most valuable asset*; that people invented money, time. Indeed, in the network-enabled metaphor, it is dubious that we even acknowledge the human implications. As such, we must come to the understanding that the most basic system of all is simply made of: 'One'[31]. The soldier is the most versatile systems platform[32]; the US Army calls it the "Future Force Warrior[33]". However, transformation focus is almost exclusively on systems and platforms; it neglects the soldiers!

"These (NEOps) concepts must enable our Soldiers"
Bill Owens, ex-CEO Nortel, NEOps Speech, 30 Nov 04

"**In today's rapidly changing World, relevancy and effectiveness depend on the** *ability* **to** *explore new ideas*, *invest in innovation*, **and** *foster a culture of continuous improvement*. To prepare the CF for future defence requirements, we will make every possible effort to invest in our people, modernize our force structure, and improve our *ability* to communicate with our members and the Canadian Public[34]". Ironically, despite the ethos of concern for people that pervades the CF, like the Auzies, the conventional view of military capability continues to be in terms of weapon systems, force structure and the like[46] (p.8). Leaders have yet to fully grasp the notion that the surest way to effect cultural change in the military is by managing careers and climate so they're aligned with desired capability and cultural outcomes[46] (p.12). Hence, the main effect of technology is the way it drives changes in other domains such as social habits, managerial practices, career possibilities and work organisation; most often these go unrecognised[46] (p.21)

Strategic *e*-Soldiers
The convergence of the Three Block War and network centric warfare has led to renewed importance and significance of individual actions on the battlefield; the rebirth of 21st Century strategic corporals[35]. "In War, Canadian Soldiers have earned a reputation as courageous tough, and resourceful fighters. In Peace support operations, Canadians are known for their compassion, objectivity and professional skill. During Domestic operations, Canadian Soldiers have responded to home crisis with equal dedication and professionalism, gaining for themselves the respect and appreciation of our entire Nation. This is a firm foundation for the future, and one that must be guarded with care and pride[36]". But this is only the start. "To be sure, the concept of the Strategic Corporal does not imply that there is only one such person. In fact, there are numerous Strategic Corporals; the challenge becomes unifying the Strategic Corporals. Merging of the Three Block War with Network Centric Warfare for the fight in Fallujah provided one possible solution. Understanding this and developing approaches that can harness the efforts of all the Strategic Corporals on the modern battlefield will significantly enhance prospects of future Victory[37]". But this cannot be envisaged without challenging the fundamental Mil-HR assumptions and paradigms. **Thus, the issue is to tackle the systematic and organisational obstacles that exist across the CF**, redesigning the entire soldier system in order to leverage the people's abilities, on the road to success. **Without a systematic, organisational ability to leverage people's abilities, capabilities will rust out**.

"The operational capability of the CF is ultimately derived from its People[38]"

"Today's Soldiers are older and better educated than their World War II counterparts. Most are married, have children, and are more than capable of making their own decisions; they therefore expect and also demand that their experience, expertise, professionalism be respected[39]"; they are strategic corporals[40].

Thus, sound judgment when dealing with exceptional cases is always preferable to rigid implementation of bureaucratic Mil-HR policies. However, we must not lose sight of the fact that the needs and wishes of individuals *may perhaps not always be consistent with the good of the organization as a whole*, and with our ability to achieve our missions. This is a delicate balancing act that requires leaders to make choices[41]. Conversely, military leaders must ensure that their interests do not abuse of the good of the organization. Furthermore, a more flexible approach is needed in an era where lifestyles and family priorities are fluid. Additionally, knowledge management is also pushing the balance of power further down an old chain of command that can no longer remain rigid, expecting to control people in a similar fashion as platforms. ***Fundamentally, the essence will no longer be to command and control, but cooperate and cultivate*. It then becomes obvious that the current Mil-HR paradigms and assumptions are not cutting it. "Defence administration must be streamlined, modernized and accelerated. It must focus first on People, the most expensive and hard-to-retain of any combat capability. The System is needlessly complex and slow, because of imposed regulations[42]",** *but also because of self-imposed measures…*

Mil-HR *e*-Strategy

"Ultimately, any Strategy should result in some kind of distinctive pattern of behaviour. In the case of HR strategy, it is the cohesion and consistency of that pattern and its relationship to the corporate strategy that determines its effectiveness and success[43]". Thus, the current Mil-HR System is not strategically aligned: **Although the CF wishes to become a learning organisation and wishes to leverage knowledge, and even if it states that People are indeed its most valuable resource, the reality is that effects are weak.** "Shaping Army Culture requires an analysis of the assumptions, procedures, and organizational design that influence current Behaviour and Policy. Unconscious cultural perceptions largely determine the Army's technology, doctrine, ethos and assumed threat[44]". This key understanding also applies to the CF: "The Cold War isolated military professionals from Society. One can argue that the trends towards greater utility, accountability, transparency, are driven at least in part by the events (since the fall of the Berlin Wall). We in the CF tried to respond to the new world using old paradigms – models of professionalism, force structure and organisation, mobility and capability that simply did not work (in the new world)[45]". In other words, fundamental change is now required to adapt the CF to its new HR strategic environment. However, talking HR in the military is too soft to fit, but **the CF must consider HR as its Achilles' heel**.

In this very sense, more brainpower and especially more actions must be directed towards managing HR. **As such, the essence of our Mil-HR *e*-Strategy should not be to increase the portion of the pie from within the Defence resources, but to open and extend the pie's outreach to external opportunities. Such opportunities exist in recruiting, training & education, heath care, HR services and more.** The strategic intent for adopting such an externally open, inter-agency approach would be, to paraphrase Clausewitz, to fully exploit all of our Nation's capabilities to enhance our National security and defence. **But analogies to Clausewitz's Prussia should end there. Rather, strategic openness is really the key.** Such a strategic change however, will require a fundamental redefinition not only of the way we conduct the CF business, but also a fundamental rethinking of our most basic Mil-HR management assumptions. **Indeed, to seize new and emerging opportunities in Canadian society at large, as well as in agencies along which the CF will inevitably co-operate, will require an unprecedented sense of open intellect.** Shifting from a present focus on tangibles (money & time) to a future focus on intangibles (networks and knowledge, through systems and people) will be a key determinant of success in future operations. **Cultural openness enabling connections of structural networks & human knowledge will be crucial. It will truly require a focus on CF core business and a Team Canada spirit, thinking out of the box. <u>Strategic openness then becomes the vital ground and centre of gravity to generating *e*-Soldiers</u>:**

Military Human Resources *e*-Strategy

e-Strategy diagram. Labels: Future, Present, Networks (Structural Capital), **Intangibles** (Abilities), *Society*, Systems, **Openness** (Social Capital), Knowledge (Human Capital), Money, Capabilities, People, *Agencies*, **"Imagine"**, *Shifting Focus*, Time, **Tangibles** (Capacities), Unlimited, Limited.

e-Soldiers' Life Cycle

The key to CF capabilities then becomes not platforms or capacities, but p*eople and their abilities*. Furthermore, the centre of gravity for leveraging the 'intangibles' then becomes cultural openness.
Faced with this HR *e*-Strategy, it becomes imperative, even urgent in the current transformation context, to redesign Mil-HR, not by wrapping ourselves in superficial change, but changing people fundamentals. Although the CF has embarked on the road to network-enabled operations and knowledge management, clearly, the human impacts and consequences of these fundamental changes are largely underestimated:
Key human capital challenges include encouraging knowledge and ideas to come forward, exploiting *e*-Soldiers' sense of initiative, managing the individuals, encouraging *e*-Soldiers to learn and experiment.
Key structural capital challenges include ensuring a free flow of information, enabling exchanges of ideas / knowledge, fostering a willingness to learn, share, change and integrating HR enterprise systems.
Key social capital challenges include developing our ethos concretely, fostering esprit de corps as well as transformational leadership, finding practical ways of shaping the CF culture, stabilising the future CF.
As simple as these might seem from a strategic perspective, they are constrained by current HR policies, plans, programs and practices, which in turn are constrained by the culture they seek to change. In essence, solutions rest in holistically adapting and redesigning the *e*-Soldiers' life cycle:

e-Soldiers' Life Cycle

← 3 Months → | ← 3 Years Timeframe →

Soldiers' Managed Readiness Framework

When	Attract	Enrol	Shape	Enable	Assign	Employ	Deploy	Transit
What	Quantity Profesn'l Specialst Leaders	Quality Values Talent Future	Warriors Culture Teams	Soldiers Teams Learning	Teams Abilities Training	Abilities Future Teams	Fighters Operations	Citizens
				Joint Task Forces				
How	Image, Policies & Social Contract Referees	Online Quickly Locally	BMQ+ 3Block Warfare Values	*e*-HRM HR Self Service Culture	**Competitively** Online Options Mobility	Online Families Stability	Select Teams	Flexibility Priority
Where	Locally	Online CRFG	CFLRS On-Job	Online	Locally	Locally Globally	Locally Globally	Res-Reg Civilian

Attracting *e*-Soldiers

The current crisis in Mil-HR, as is the case with many other militaries, "is being articulated… in terms of issues of recruitment and retention. But these are symptoms rather than causes[46]". As the ADF (Australian Defence Force), the CF "enters the 21st Century with a mid 20th Century employment system and with a mid 20th Century approach to personnel management[46]". Worse yet: "Many believe that the current (HR) personnel problems can be fixed with more efficient recruitment and better financial conditions of service... They could scarcely be more wrong". "**Increases in resources, will not be translated into capability unless *'intangibles'* of organisational performance are given equal attention[46]**". Indeed, the authors continue: "The nature of the military profession might have changed; its essential function of war fighting might have become more complex, but success on the battlefield (however defined in an era of peacekeeping operations) still relies on the skills and values of the Warrior[46]"; **Back to fundamentals!**

In the midst of the recent DPS Force Expansion announcement[47] nobody noticed the elephant in the room; the CF Recruiting System is broken and urgently needs to be fixed[48]. The size of the CF's demographic target group is also in decline, meaning there will be fewer people from which to draw recruits[49]. Further more, the current economic context does not favour traditional military recruiting approaches. And that is if we assume that the current recruiting scheme made the right planning assumptions and is well focused. Indeed, good people are hard to come by, especially in the current economic context, and we don't want to miss out on any of them. Thus, the fundamental question: is the current recruiting scheme is helping? Furthermore, from an external perspective, does our military really qualify as a top employer of choice[50]? Or simply, is the CF whole-heartedly respecting the social contract it engages in to booster its attraction? Essentially, the CF must revisit the working assumptions that have characterised recruiting since 1914[51]. As such, the military desperately needs innovative new recruiting advertising to attract new personnel[52]. Recruiting large numbers of competent people for the military very much depends on advertising[53]; yes, as much as it also depends on the public image and perception the demographic targets have of the CF: There must be significant internal cultural reform before consistent value-image can be projected[46] (p.38). Thus, it depends much more on day-to-day public affairs, as it does on good management & leadership. Consequently, attracting people should be the sole objective of an integrated recruiting marketing office. Additionally, media sensationalism around under-manning, under-equipping, under funding really hurts; although such stories might be partly true once put into context, **focusing on the CF's successes is key**. For example, Maple Leaf[54] could be used in recruiting efforts, telling the story[55], enhancing our image.

e-Soldiers Policies

The current Mil-HR Policies implicitly limit attraction. Indeed, since there are no policies or programs to directly enrol professionals (doctors, accountants, lawyers, engineers and etc.) or specialists (technicians of all types, paramedics etc.) these would-be enrolees are discouraged at the outset of the entire process. Hence, there must be more flexible 'out-of-the-box' options, than our traditional bottom-entry schemes. Furthermore, because the cultural mindset has not evolved in synchronisation with societal expectations, it is almost sacrilege to speak of direct enrolments for professionals and specialists within our military. Indeed, for most military officers, it would seem unacceptable to have these direct entrants serve alongside regular troops, after having 'only' graduated from college and completed a basic military qualification. It would even make it worst if the CF was to sponsor certain community college students for joining the CF. Most would intuitively state that it would pose too much a risk to their troops' safety; an argument which is fallacious if we consider that civilians are as much on asymmetric frontlines as our military. Joining Doctor's-without-borders[56] would probably turn out to be riskier than joining the CF! As such, up to 44% of those attracted will not be enrolled, one-third of which will simply quit. As for the

other two-thirds, they will account as lost contacts or as other hidden types of lost opportunities. Simply put, close to half of those attracted are not captured by the social contract offering of our military, which highlights that securing attractions has failed, that the system has not evolved or recruitment is ineffective. Also, the message put out by CF branding does not fit the high-expectations socio-economic context. It is not about the CF being an employer of choice (let's not kid people) nor about the CF being young-scouts! It should be about the CF satisfying a sense of '*professionalism and adventure, at home and in the world*'. Indeed: "Despite risks, *or perhaps because of them*, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) always has more applications from volunteers than it can accept. It takes on young graduates with degrees in international relations seeking a year or two of adventure before joining banks; doctors and nurses tired of the safe ways of Swiss clinics. All come in search of one of the most elusive things in the world - ***the intangible satisfaction of doing something worthwhile***[57]". The key difference however, is that the ICRC delivers on that promise and meets its social contract; clearly, this is not the case for the CF perspective. Furthermore, there are widely diverse targets the CF should be tapping into, not shutting out at the outset: such as professionals with a taste for a 3-year adventure and specialists, with crucial knowledge to the CF. And even when the CF attracts and enrols *e*-Soldiers, in many instances it doesn't deliver on its promises. The main reasons stated for leaving the CF include: civilianization of the CF, lack of fairness, uncertainty about the future of the CF, leadership issues and bureaucracy; now just imagine some non-stated reasons! **Essentially, this really depends on respecting the social contract the CF and enrolees engage in. It is obvious that youth wishing to hunt the Red October[58], would not be attracted to our submarines!**

e-Soldiers' Social Contract

"The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before[59]". In essence, the idea of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Social Contract was to permit individuals to retain their own rights and freedoms in all forms of organisation. Today, the fundamental premises of 'the social contract' are truer then ever in contemporary history. *e*-Soldiers are fairly idealistic and are motivated by a combination of the idea of soldiering as a 'higher calling' and the need to prove themselves; it is easy to see how many become disillusioned with reality[60]. Individual expectations are commensurate to the opportunities offered by globalisation and technologies. **Traditional 'one-size-fits-all' approaches are no longer valid; they are relics of conscription times. So, it may seem like stating the obvious but: everybody is special, which requires special attention! As in asymmetry, adaptability and flexibility become key considerations in addressing expectations**. It is no longer a matter of recruiting and mobilizing masses, but a matter of the CF addressing individuals. One social contract might better fit a particular professional group, with exceptions requiring openness and adaptability on the part of the system, in order to secure in exchange, a higher form of commitment. And because everybody is special, openness and a climate of inclusion benefit business performance[61]. Thus, revisiting the CF's social contract offering is crucial, adapting it to Canadians' modern realities.

Imagine…
Civilian Doctors that would sign-up online for 3-year tours to support and deploy with CF Task Forces; Doctors to which would be given a 3-month basic military course and an operational medicine speciality; Doctors that would wear the uniform at the professional rank of Doctor and do real cool stuff for 3 years. *But we can't do that! It implies changing the rank structure! It implies changing the CF force generation!* Or imagine Pilots, from Air Canada[62], signing-up for 3-years, to see another face of the World, flying a Cargo Starship, joining Task Force 10-01 deploying to Drakovia, after having completed BMQ, a combat aviation course and combat survival course, supporting deployments of TF 10-01 in Training and Theatre. W*e can't do that! It implies streamlining, modernizing and accelerating the whole Mil-HR management...*

Enrolling *e*-Soldiers

Prospective perfect candidates account for only 3% of applicants[63], meaning the bulk requires facilitation. Administratively, a number of immediate steps must be taken to streamline the whole recruiting scheme: "It is easier to join the Australian Army online, than to transfer (from the Reserves) to the Regular CF[64]". To start, internal recruiting: regular, reserves, rangers and cadets, are the prime quality recruiting engines. Indeed, the CF needs to facilitate the process of transferring between Regular and Reserve components[65]. But because of the so-called 'inherent' inflexibilities in the Mil-HR policies, nothing is gained; often lost. For example, class C contracts are not offered to reservists until such time as they actually deploy on Ops. These are symptoms rather than causes but they only serve to highlight the CF self-imposed complexities. Namely, why couldn't Regular Force members be allowed to enrol in Reserves for some time and return? Furthermore, is the distinction between Regular and Reserves still a valid one in the context of forming Joint Task Forces for planned operations, which can be readiness managed[66], from constitution to end? It would make more sense to publish job employment *e*-opportunities within the military, for such a task! And once candidates are selected, to sign 3-year contracts binding them until mission is accomplished. Professional positions could also be offered and filled by professionals - doctors, accountants, engineers. **It would be more attractive and efficient to manage Mil-HR according to their individual abilities.** Fundamentally, this implies critically rethinking how the CF generates people in order to generate forces. However, such a competitive Mil-HR paradigm also requires thinking out of the box! Are we ready yet?

"People can have the Model T in any colour - So long as it's black[67]!"
The Day Henry Ford lost the Market!

Out-of-the box thinking requires *openness* to new ways of seeing the world and a willingness to explore[68]: Who said that the lowest common denominator had to be applied equally to all soldiers, just like robots? Who said all enrolees are equal? Who said the CF cannot leverage Canada's education, via equivalencies? Can we not streamline enrolment time, recognise education while focusing more on the CF core business? It may seem there are more questions than answers, but answers are out there, if the CF will only open-up. As such, we could consider outsourcing the recruiting administrative processes, focusing on CF attraction. Paramedics could be hired, shaped via a basic military qualification and assigned to a JTF to be deployed. This would have positive effects, streamlining, modernizing and accelerating the CF's enrolment scheme. Indeed, about 7% of our GDP is invested annually in education, while only 1% is invested for Defence[69]. The real question then is not if we have answers, but rather, if we have the will to tackle these questions! Could we consider creating new direct-entry schemes for specialists, professionals and perhaps warrants? Would it be acceptable to a traditional military culture to train these direct-entrants only in military fields, while recognising their education, experience and equivalencies and thereby, focusing on core business? As such, online pre-enrolment screening could easily be done thanks to an interactive recruiting website. **Prospective candidates could pre-screen themselves, assuming most administrative responsibilities.** After all, isn't that the responsible, educated, innovative and dynamic knowledge *e*-Soldier we truly need? Military job openings and military opportunities of all types could also be posted online: www.jobs.gc.ca; With 1,5M visitors monthly, why is the CF not exploiting such an opportunity in seeking advertisement? Is it because we haven't realized yet **the necessity of openness to leverage inter-agency opportunities**? Mastering the strategic art of war[70] requires leaders with vision to see beyond the bureaucratic barriers. But beyond the issues of enrolment, the whole *e*-Soldiers' life cycle needs fundamental transformation. And in order to leverage the *e*-Soldiers' abilities, an integrated, seamless HR management is necessary. "At the time when the (Auzie) Army senior leadership is struggling to find ways to retain its people, the evidence suggests the solution lies in an area on which the Army has always prided itself; **Leadership**[71]".

<u>Shaping *e*-Soldiers</u>
Beyond enrolment, the entire Mil-HR System is in urgent need of fundamental and strategic rethinking. Therefore, "if small wars need a global response; if officers must manage physical and structural violence that is inextricably linked; if values and culture are changing in ways that affect concepts of security; and if the military response must be integrated with political and social responses, then education is indeed the vital ground of the future. Armed forces can no longer rely on rote indoctrination, but depend increasingly on professional education to adjust to changing values and prepare for (future) complex new missions[72]". Education therefore, does play a crucial role in shaping the intangibles that sustain superior performance. For our *e*-Soldiers, this means considering education in a larger sense, from formal education in schools, recognising equivalencies and exploiting lessons learned, to informal education about life and society, and practical life experiences at large. It might also include new education fields, like languages and cultures. **However again, the essence of this new individual training paradigm rests with *Strategic Openness*.**

Enrolling a former city police officer as a military police could prove valuable in capturing knowledge. Recognizing this enrolees' knowledge, both intellectual and practical, could help shape military policing, but it would remain vital however, to train such an enrolee in the core business of CF military operations. E-lessons learned, distance e-learning opportunities as well as networked hard skills training could all be explored to leverage the opportunities offered by new simulation and training technologies in Canada: "Defence industry schoolhouses are facing tight or reduced budgets, requiring them to cut training costs without sacrificing quality of training, while remaining responsive to operational training needs. Creative approaches to achieving these goals include finding ways to reduce wear and tear on the equipment used for training, reducing travel and living costs by shortening time spent in the classroom and improving classroom safety by decreasing the risk of injury. Each of these objectives fit with the use of technology to create Hard Skills Simulations[73]". Fundamentally however, "**the common thread uniting all training activities is an emphasis on the growth of integrity, courage, initiative, decisiveness, mental agility and personal accountability (*abilities*). These qualities and attributes are fundamental. They must be aggressively cultivated in all Marines from the first day of their enlistment[74]**". The remaining vestiges of the zero-defects-mentality, within all our training establishments, must be exchanged for an interactive experience-based shaping environment, within which e-Soldiers are afforded initiative as well as the freedom to fail or succeed in training, and with it, the opportunity to learn and grow by sharing the lessons learned. Micro-management training must become a thing of the past, while proactive mentoring must complement supervision. As Canadians have always been strategic corporals, these prove crucial.

"Social capital is central to understanding how military forces adapt to social and cultural change[75]". As such, the regimental and occupational systems of career management have served the CF well during the last two World Wars. Today however, because integration, both conceptual and physical, is necessary in order to leverage the opportunities offered by new technologies, *Regiments* **have now become obstacles**. Inherently patriarchal, the regimental system reflects a social order dating of age before the late 1960's[76]. If our main intent is of "producing soldiers and leaders who are universally ready for combat and related operations along side the best[77]", the focus then should simply be on producing the best soldiers / leaders, without regards or consideration for the historical affiliations, that are now essentially corrupting the CF. Military museums and heritage sites, which should also become the business of Heritage & Parks Canada, would be more than happy to house Canadian regimental regalia as ultimate souvenirs of two World wars. Shaping *e*-Soldiers by training means, intellectual and practical, would no longer be a matter of affiliation, but rather, a matter of collaboration between all *e*-Soldiers, which would be fused together in Task Forces. **The new CF Regimental system for that matter would be based on combat teams and task forces**.

Enabling *e*-Soldiers

 "A common complaint about HR in organisations is that the various components do not always work together as a system. In this respect, the Canadian Forces is no different than other large organisations[78]". Theoretically, all the functions of the HR System or *e*-Soldiers life cycle, from attraction to enrolment, on to basic shaping, first assignment, management, employment, deployment and re-assignment, should comprise one integrated and coordinated system, resulting in well-run human resources across the CF. The issue then becomes one of fully integrating across the organisation via a single HR policy framework, taking into consideration the environmental and regional particularities, while decentralising execution to the chain-of-command in line with our mission command philosophy. Indeed, in trying to effectively and efficiently manage our Mil-HR, too many policy-issuing agencies are literally in conflict of interest. This stovepipe approach further complicates day-to-day HR-Mil management. Mil-HR information systems integration is also necessary to allow seamless management. Further integrating into a single enterprise resource planning system, HR would be streamlined and would leverage the effects of new technology. However, significant and fundamental gaps exist in the HR planning and management capabilities, not least of which is the cultural blockade that exists in most military leaders' mind when considering HR. **Leaders must consider HR as our Achilles' heel; as the key to success in enabling *e*-Capabilities**[79].

However in most cases, HR is an afterthought and not a strategic consideration by military leaders. The most common understanding of capabilities, still resides in the integrated effect of platforms and systems. **The underlying assumption, taken for granted, is that *e*-Soldiers will simply enable these platforms**; that is assuming HR conditions are right. This is a dangerous assumption to make within Transformation. Indeed, the current Mil-HR management system does not operate as a system and does not enable people. The system, or bureaucracy, should not restrict *e*-Soldiers in developing their talents; but it does[46] (p.116). Furthermore, because it is essentially interest-based and stove piped by portfolios, it is counterproductive. The issue is not to create a supreme HR management authority; ultimately, it is the chain-of-command. Rather, it is to affect an integrated policy framework to focus application by those commanding soldiers in ways that will foster the internal HR management environment, which will enable CF transformation. As such, Policy authority should clearly rest with a Mil-HR agency, while application should also clearly rest with commanders whom, within that policy framework, need to be held responsible and accountable. For Mission Command to be successful there must be an absolute commitment to accountability, and Mission Command must be reflected in culture and climate at every level, in every undertaking[46] (p.114). **This internal paradigm change essentially means a fundamental change in HR management roles.**

Managing Mil-HR then, would not remain the purview of a few specialists located in Headquarters, but become the responsibility of the commanders, which would operate within integrated Mil-HR policies. Harassment prevention, equity employment, quality of work life and personal life balance would become programs implemented by commanders, with support from an HR-Mil policy agency, providing toolkits. Within each unit, the key functions performed by captain-adjutants would become that of an HR officer, specialising in managing the entire *e*-Soldiers life cycle, from attraction all the way to life transitions. Furthermore, moving from fatherhood to adulthood will become key to organisational cultural evolution, where *e*-Soldiers would do most of their own HR services on-line, seamlessly across the CF for example. This empowering of *e*-Soldiers, via information technologies, will require command cultural change, in that **the essence will no longer be to command & control, but to cooperate & cultivate**, as in the transformational leadership idea that seeks to be more inspirational, less restrictive and not coercive. This would also help in shaping the work environment and CF culture, acknowledging the changes in society which, in line with the knowledge management premises, go long ways in enabling *e*-Soldiers.

Assigning *e*-Soldiers

"Constant job rotation at all levels, and poor preparation for some type of postings, undermines the ability of leaders to build high performance climates. Performance in staff environments in particular, is highly sensitive to job rotation[71]". Unit cohesion is also directly impacted by the annual posting season (APS), but to a large extent our Forces are victim of their own misalignment and poor HR management practices. Actions and decisions of leaders have profound influence on organisational climate and culture[46] (p.114). Now that the Forces envisages a managed readiness framework, which essentially considers platforms and units, logic dictates that HR management also requires an *e*-Soldiers managed readiness framework. Such a framework, would consider the entire Soldier life cycle, from attraction to enrolment, to shaping and enabling, first assignment and team building, employing and deploying, re-assigning or transitioning, and this, along our *e*-Forces[80] integrated capabilities, joint task forces managed readiness frameworks. Based on a 3-year cycle, such a framework would allow issuance of contracts to merit-selected personnel with the clear determined outcome to stand-up, train, employ and deploy the team within the 3-year cycle. Thus, not only could reservists and professionals join CF task forces, but regular force personnel could also count on a more predictable CF managed readiness system. **And a competitive military assignment scheme would prove valuable in securing the intangibles such as higher commitment & ownership.**

From the managed readiness framework, all military assignment opportunities could be posted online, sufficiently in advance for a determined joint task force cadre to proceed with competitive selections. Leveraging IT and information systems, such a competitive military selection process would be radically streamlined; screening criteria, fitting candidates and allowing instant access to *e*-Soldier's candidate file. All activities related to such a process could be automated: from application to issuance of final message. Inherent integrity, responsibility, equitability & accountability would be assured by information systems. *e*-Officers would simply need to fill military employment opportunities templates online, and *e*-Soldiers would access filtered offers according to their parameters (rank etc.) and hit apply on their cell-phones… A small-focused central HR staff would guarantee process' integrity, affecting particular circumstances. This would also radically and fundamentally change the human dynamics within our military culture. **Internal military competitiveness would create a culture of meritocracy[81] and enable our ethos. Paradoxically, military competition would arise in connectivity, in the same way as co-operation.** Furthermore, any policy criteria could be factored-in, such as QOL issues like Home Away Time etc. The essence rests on establishing a single integrated HR enterprise-resource planning or SERP system.

Furthermore, calculating careers could be an affair of cumulative service, not of continuous one…
Careers can be powerful agents of progress but can also be impediments to change or adaptability[46] (p.13). The fundamental issue then becomes one of holistically redefining the mechanics of the Mil-HR System. As such, for example, job protection legislation should be implemented to support deployed reservists[82]. Increasing the flexibility to members by adopting rejuvenating policies would also prove more beneficial, ensuring veterans have job transferring opportunities, or that civilian equivalencies are more easily recognized. Should it not be possible to enrol one as a parachutist, holding a valid class B parachuting licence[83]? Sure, the enrolee would still have to qualify, completing basic military and combat arms qualifications… Hence, "natural selection has been defined as a process that promotes the survival of species that are able to adapt to changes in environments. While it is normally discussed in scientific circles, natural selection has its place in the military environment as well[84]". As such, establishing a competitive CF employment system within the military, could prove a valuable way of capturing knowledge, intellectual and practical, as well as it could prove valuable in exploiting potential and engaging *e*-Soldiers in achieving satisfaction. Assignments should be based on tangible knowledge.

Employing *e*-Soldiers
"Every opportunity must be seized to contribute to growth of character & leadership within every Marine. We must remember that simple fact, and also remember that leaders are judged, ultimately, by the quality of the leadership reflected in their subordinates[85]". Thus, current CF leadership focus is partly erroneous: Perhaps it should focus more on leading, in practical ways, rather than on instructing leaders in the art. Furthermore, leadership is not the art of the individual leader but the practice of influence within teams. Career development priority has traditionally been on developing leaders, not on developing leadership; this is a subtle but crucial distinction: **Key leader performance element must be unit climate**[46] (p.116). The current need is to focus leadership performance feedback more on the climate in the unit (via a 360° evaluation) and on team performance; much less on the performance of the individual leaders[46] (p.107). Thus, senior officer bonuses should perhaps be turned into bonuses for teams and most valuable players. "There is value designing 360° feedback instruments for CF leader development and cultural change[86]". With this paradigm change there are further implications upon the entire soldier life cycle, as described. **Simply, team appreciations would be more reflective than stale individual performance appraisals.** Measured against the results of mission success, in garrison or in the field, teams would lead by example. Leaders would become more walk & less talk; *e*-Soldiers would be inspired by actions, not publications. Changing performance evaluation reporting by 360 team appreciation[87] would enable transformation. Focusing at the team level, such an appreciation process would further empower all our junior leaders. Automated team appreciations could further be seamlessly linked to each *e*-Soldiers CF service *e*-file. Factoring individual competencies, abilities, experience & potential would further leverage knowledge. Finally, team appreciations would also be linked to the joint task force appreciation of its missions. **In essence, to put it simply:** *"Generals do not victories make; captains, sergeants and soldiers do[88]".*

The military continues to be one of few professions that engage in wide-spread generalist job rotation. In other professions, people may change just as often, but there is invariably a stronger degree of continuity or consistency in all their jobs. **Most organisations find it impractical to maintain high job rotation**[46]. Hence, the MOSART[89] project is indeed an important initiative in the effort to transform the CF in an organization geared towards its own future. The issue however is that unless the entire *e*-Soldier's life cycle is fundamentally adapted in parallel, the single redesign of occupations is likely to be a visionning exercise void in effect, if policies are not well aligned. For example, designing a new employment field for ISTAR could lead to interesting ideas and synergy in terms of career management and individual training & education. However, unless such a new capability is enforced through clear policy upon the CF force generators, it will effectively depend on their other interests; hence, the Army might be reluntant to 'let go' their Recce, TUAV or Intel assets to boost the CF ISTAR. This highlights the disconnect between force generation and force employment which needs streamlining. Naturally as a family, generators shape family cultures, whereas employers merely employ them. Hence, force generation and employment must be integrated, generating *e*-Soldiers within combat teams and task forces for employment & deployment. And employing *e*-Soldiers in the future, should not be the business of who you know, but what you know. As such, a holistic, integrated, seamless and competitive HR system is required to affect true HR strategy. Furthermore, **broadening the employment scope of the CF workforce as a whole becomes necessary:** Most of those who drop out of the central core leave; this is what the system wants to free-up promotions. However, the institution unwittingly loses talent that it could usefully employ longer elsewhere[46] (p.101). But in the Information Age, organisations that waste the professional skills and creativity of middle-level employees are applying a huge handicap to their potential productivity and even their survivability[46] (p.27). Additionally, youth demand careers that allow faster engagement with work after joining as well as much more flexibility[46] (p.25). **Hence, their ability to directly influence their careers online is key.**

Deploying _e_-Soldiers
The ability to attract and retain sufficient members from the future generations will require changes to recruiting; more importantly, it will require changes to how careers are structured and managed[46] (p.38). **For the CF to dispose of the right balance of quality people, in the right quantity, openess is key**. **Joining a JTF for operations, at home or abroad, must become the e-Soldier's life cycle climax.** "The first step of the process is unchanged: Bold, capable, and intelligent men and women of character are drawn to the Corps, and are recast in the crucible of recruit training, where time honoured methods instil deep within them the Corps' enduring ethos; honour, courage and commitment become more than mere words. Those precious virtues become the defining aspect of each Marine. Emphasis on character remains the bedrock upon which everything else is built. More often, the really tough issues confronting Marines will be moral quandaries and they must have the wherewithal to handle them appropriately[90]". In the emerging complex battle space, highly trained, well educated _e_-Soldiers, strategically deployed, will have to deal with a much broader spectrum of complexities than any of their modern predecessors. Faced with the three-block-war challenges, complicated by technology, urbanisation and demographics, _e_-Soldiers on operations will not only have the combat leverage effect of many modern special soldiers today, but will also be expected to deal with intangible issues such as sensitivity to culture and history. The foundations for such _e_-Soldiers can be hard to establish from our vantage point today, or so we think. But it really resounds in unison: **It will be found in the fundamental values transcending _e_-Soldiers.** Hence, recommendations from the Army Culture and Climate survey include: addressing the e-Soldiers' expectations, bolstering affective commitment, enhancing leadership[91]". _**Or in other words: Open-up**_**!** Deployment incentives should also be considered, in terms of bonuses and as a necessity for promotions. "Combat readiness and personal and family readiness are inseparable. Marine Corps Community Services is working aggressively to strengthen the readiness of our Marines and families, enhancing their QOL[92]".

**"Moral is to the Physical as three is to one"**, Napoleon

Transitioning e-Soldiers
If the Forces are easily willing to hand out generous bonuses to new enrolees that hold crucial knowledge, logically, the CF should be as willing to hand out retention bonuses to currently serving senior _e_-Soldiers. Indeed, junior and senior non-commissioned officers are commonly referred to as the backbone of the CF. It is they who carry the weight of shaping, enabling, employing and deploying _e_-Soldiers on a daily basis and it also they who carry the bulk of the CF's body of organisational knowledge, as the KM theory goes. Over time, the investment made towards these abilities, equals more then that of all capabilities together. For some reason, there exists a clear policy gap ensuring effective retention measures for our _e_-Soldiers. Simply put, if _e_-Soldiers' expectations are not met, attrition is likely to increase and cynicism will grow: _e_-Soldiers expect tough and exciting CF collective training as well as they wish for continuous challenge. _e_-Soldiers wish to be involved in the decision-making process and to be valued for their CF contribution. _e_-Soldiers are insisting on influence over their professional development and their career management and as such should all have individual development plans and different assignment and employment options[60]. Beyond service in the CF, there are many ways for the CF to keep leveraging key investments in abilities. Namely, allowing for priority transitioning to the Public Service, hiring ex-soldiers in support functions, or simply transferring between Regular and Reserve components, would help secure the CF's investment. **Considering that the strategic intent is to open up to extend the outreach of the pie to new external opportunities, this should be done both upstream and downstream of the _e_-Soldiers CF life cycle.** As such, hiring back veterans as Defence public servants, or as a preferred option when contracting out, could prove tangible and valuable means of achieving effect, beyond the end of active service in the CF[93]. Fundamentally, **HR issues have little to do with money/time; it has everything to do with leadership.**

_e_-Soldiers' Renaissance
We are faced with the absence of any identifiable HR system that is integrated and responsive to the CF:
"Decentralisation without corporate guidance leads to inconsistency of application, reducing success[94]".
In essence, Mil-HR must be centralised by policy, but decentralised both in application and management.
And the need is not for a supreme HR authority; the chain-of-command is ultimately accountable for HR.
Changing involves making the actual changes that might move the organisation yet to another level: new
goals and milestones need creating; ownership of the change programme must be actively encouraged by
acts such as promoting individuals who are willing and able to adapt, changing job titles or organisational
structures. Changing reporting structures and reward systems are also common. The new culture should,
therefore, begin to take shape as individuals come to an understanding of the changes required of them[95].
The continued adherence to old-fashioned ways of managing HR is still hurting in many ways[46] (p.139).
Thinking strategically and holistically about personnel will produce more than simple changes[46] (p.14).
Leaders must acknowledge the problem in all its dimensions. It is not just a leadership issue and it is not a
technical or structural issue: it is a people/HR issue. This is where true capabilities are generated[46] (p.138)

Like the Auzies, until the CF is willing and able to modify its thinking about employment systems and to
confront those aspects of culture that truly impede change, it will continue to be dogged by performance
problems of which recruitment and retention are simply the most visible issues and symptoms[46] (p.139).
And the 30% ratio officers to NCMs within the CF only serves cynicysm, when more NCMs are needed.
Hence, leader's actions/decisions have profound influence on organisational climate and culture[46] (p.114).
Therefore, we must not cling too tightly to 'eternal verities' in formulating a CF professional development
paradigm to fit the new culture. Paradoxically, the very strengths at the operational level contain the seeds
of weaknesses at the strategic level. There is a strong view at and below middle-level leadership that 'it
ain't broke, so it doesn't need fixing'. Understandable as such views are, they blind CF leaders to deeper
issues at the CF cultural and the strategic management levels. Many aspects of culture still reflect the
pragmatic, narrowly focused, introverted, sociable and masculine traditional Canada of the early- to mid-
20th Century. Even in the last decades, Leaders have tried to keep to their old ways amidst change[46] (p.3).

"Hope is not a method[96]"

"Although the Canadian Army has recognized the inescapable reality that culture will not change itself, it
is not an idea that most 'soldiers' are comfortable dealing with. Many view it as 'soft and spongy' and
would prefer that it be discussed away from the 'real world of real soldiering'. This aversion to dealing
with military culture and ethos is compounded by the fact that the normal command and staff structure is
already operating at maximum capacity in dealing with the high stress demands of today's operations and
critical resource problems - issues that are more susceptible to empirical solutions. However, if, as has
been concluded by nearly every student of military culture, that it is the bedrock of military effectiveness,
it simply cannot be ignored. It is a subject that deserves the attention of the nation's military and political
leadership. It also deserves informed and open public debate in the media as well as in academia[97]".
"In addition, we must not forget that the greatest contribution the Canadian Forces makes to any operation
or coalition is the skill, knowledge and attitudes of our soldiers. The half-life of skills (_abilities_) is very
short and once they are gone, they take a very long time to regenerate. The focus of General Hillier's
visionary Team Canada approach, as a joint and integrated transformation of the Canadian Forces, may
relieve some of the necessity the Army has faced in the dismantling of key capabilities. But there should
be no need to train to the lowest common denominator, nor to risk sending _e_-Soldiers into a fair fight[98]".
Success will lie in how we think and as such, strategic openess becomes key to generate _e_-Soldiers.

e-Soldiers' Conclusion

Fundamentally, CF leaders must understand that traditional HR-Mil approaches no longer work.
Hence, the basic ideas then are first and foremost for the CF to admit that HR-Mil systems need adapting.
Then, it is for the CF to strategically open-up and adapt, in order to exploit new external opportunities.
Finally, it is for the CF to rejuvenate itself, ensuring the Institution's viability and long-term survivability.
From a strategic perspective people are not only our most valuable asset; they are our most expensive one.
Through a complete overhaul of force structures, which should be closely aligned to our *e*-Capabilities[15],
all *e*-Soldiers need to be employed how, where, when and for what they have most effect: on operations.
Indeed, operations are *our raison d'être;* integrated enabling activities need to be no more than enabling.
Our force structures must flow seamlessly, from force generation to force employment and deployment.
As we know them today, Regiments have become institutional barriers to our CF Transformation.
Fundamentally, this is a question of leadership. And good leaders must learn to become better managers.
Expressing clear vision is one thing; actually having the wherewithal and guts to implement it is another.
HR-Mil must not only have strategic insight and input; simply put, it must become strategic in all minds.
In conclusion, does this Mil-HR transformational shift require money and time? Of course it does, but not
as much as it needs leadership and imagination to employ finite money and time at the really critical spot.
**In essence, it is important to remember that transformation has a critical enabler: people. Hence,
we cannot transform without developing our thinking and changing our ways of doing things[99]. CF
transformation must not end with HR policies, programs & practices, but start with them as its key**.
Thus, redesigning the entire HR-Mil system, focusing on *e*-Soldier's life cycle, becomes quintessential.
"The immediate need is to confront and push through changes to the personnel system not in a methodical
plodding and half-hearted way that such changes have been approached before, but with the imagination
and verve that will serve as symbols of the intellectual / professional horsepower of a vital institution[100]" -
and assuming corporate risk also becomes an essential stepping-stone in strategically opening up.

> *"Everything that can be invented has been invented!"* **(Not)**
> Charles H. Duell, Director of the US Patent Office, 1899

"Organisations need dissenters or 'useful troublemakers' to promote innovation. The dissenter may have
eureka ideas, but also pushes others to think more creatively, challenging traditional thought patterns[101]"...
Today, it must be understood that the competitive edge is achieved not with technology alone, but with the
appropriate organizational structure and culture to optimize technologies. The greatest implications of the
future have less to do with technology, than with changing social and organizational structure and cultures.
And from there, Mission Command would eventually take life, becoming more then mere stated doctrine.
Hence, changing the HR rules of the game will go long way in shaping the desired and required culture.
Based on our Ethos, CF Culture would truly enable Transformation; that never-ending quest for success.
Articulating our e-Soldiers' metaphor simply is that: **"Successful leaders in the future will be the ones
who think through their tasks sufficiently clearly to take advantage of social and cultural change[102]".**

> *"For myself, I am an Optimist; it does not seem to be much use, being anything else"*
> Winston Churchill, Speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet, November 9, 1954

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e-Soldiers' Key Ideas - I

General
- ✓ Fundamentally adapt the HR-Mil system by changing policies, programs & practices
- ✓ Establish a Soldier life cycle in-sync with the CF Managed Readiness Framework

Attract
- ✓ Focusing on the CF's successes and telling our stories to the public (Ex: CF News)
- ✓ Adventure & professionalism tap into the 'intangible' satisfaction of being Military
- ✓ Securing attraction by respecting the CF social contract is key to recruiting quality
- ✓ Flexible entry-schemes are needed for professionals, specialists, warrants, leaders

Enrol
- ✓ 'One-size-fits-all' approaches are no longer valid; they're relics of conscription times
- ✓ Adaptability & flexibility become key considerations for addressing *e*-Expectations
- ✓ Enrolees could pre-screen themselves, assuming most administrative responsibilities

Shape
- ✓ The essence of this new individual training paradigm rests with strategic openness
- ✓ The new regimental system would not be occupational but operational task focused

Enable
- ✓ We must consider HR as our Achilles' heel; as key to success enabling capabilities
- ✓ The dangerous underlying assumption is that *e*-Soldiers will simply enable platforms
- ✓ The chain-of-command is ultimately responsible & accountable for HR management
- ✓ <u>The essence will no longer be to command & control, but to cooperate & cultivate</u>
- ✓ *e*-Soldiers must be employed how, where, when, for what they have most effect: Ops

e-Soldiers' Key Ideas - II

Assign
- ✓ Competitive assignments would secure intangibles like commitment & ownership
- ✓ Team building, team fusing & team evaluating are key to enabling esprit de corps
- ✓ Military competitiveness would create a culture of meritocracy, enabling our ethos

Employ
- ✓ Key leader performance element must be unit climate, via 360° team appreciations
- ✓ Team appreciations are more reflective than stale Individual performance appraisals
- ✓ Broadening employment scope of the CF workforce as a whole becomes necessary
- ✓ *e*-Soldiers' ability to directly influence their own career management (online) is key

Deploy
- ✓ Openness is key to dispose of the right balance of quality people in the right quantity
- ✓ Values transcending *e*-Soldiers reflect the fundamental human dimension of warfare

Transition
- ✓ HR issues have little to do with money/time; it has everything to do with leadership
- ✓ The intent is to open up to extend the pie to new downstream external opportunities

HR *e*-Strategy
- ✓ The operational capability of the CF is ultimately derived from its people *abilities*
- ✓ Strategic openness is both centre of gravity and vital ground of CF transformation
- ✓ Opportunities exist in recruiting, training & education, heath care, HR services…
- ✓ The intellectual capacity/ability of CF members is the most effective Security means
- ✓ <u>Successful leaders will think through to take advantage of social and cultural change</u>

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