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REFLECTIONS
ON LIGHT INFANTRY AN
ESSENTIAL CAPABILITY TO
DEVELOP SKILLS, WILLPOWER AND TEAMWORK CONTENT
INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................................................................................
3
BACKGROUND...........................................................................................................................................................................
4
OPERATIONAL
REQUIREMENT...................................................................................................................................................
6
TRAINING
REQUIREMENT............................................................................................................................................................
8
COPING
WITH THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE...........................................................................................................................
10
RECOMMENDATIONS.......................................................................................................................................................
12
CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................................................................
13
BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................................................................................
14
INTRODUCTION
1.
Much
has been written on the subject of the need for light infantry forces as a
complementary force option for modern armies.
Since the end of the cold war and the demise of the 2.
However, this is not the first time that such changes have affected the
military profession as a whole: chariots, chivalry, gunpowder, machine guns,
tanks are several examples that can be taken from history books.
Moreover, given the fact that we are entering a new era, which we be
called the Information Age, it implies that changes will be more profound.
We can already see the effect of these changes in the increasing focus
that the military community is giving to trends related to the management of
information. We recognize as it
stands the Intelligence Analysis of the Battlefield as a force multiplier.
Information Operation tends to become a discipline by itself.
Psychological Operations, Public Affairs, Electronic Warfare capabilities
take more importance in the planning process than they used to take.
These changes are mostly known as the “Revolution in Military
Affairs”. 3.
With the introduction of the LAV all regular infantry units will be
equipped and re-rolled into LAV units. Given
the technological enhancements acquired through the LAV platform, the Canadian
army and the infantry in particular is at a crossroad in terms of maintaining a
balanced skilset. With
the LAV, soldiers will spend inordinate amounts of time training on the vehicle
just to maintain platform related skilset. Invariably,
over time their most basic and fundamental infantry fighting skills will erode
thereby decreasing the armies overall multipurpose combat capability. This paper
argues that maintaining a light force capability is the most cost effective
means by which the Canadian army can best preserve the basic and most
fundamental infantry fighting skills while benefiting from the enhanced
capabilities provided through LAV. It
is intended to stimulate professional reflection and debate on the question of
maintaining light infantry as a capability for the Canadian Forces. 4.
All components of the force need to evolve to respond efficiently and
effectively to the challenges of tomorrow. In
order to face these challenges, the Canadian Army infantry needs to retain and
maintain skilled professional NCOs and officers.
Facing changes and coping with them represent a challenge of its own by
itself, doing it while restructuring the force is only adding to the complexity
of the task at hand. It is therefore
of the utmost importance that issues, such as retaining Light Infantry as a
capability be discussed among professionals in order to provide all the
necessary insight before a final decision is made.
Senior leadership will then have the necessary elements to make a well
informed and balanced decision fostering an approach whereby the infantry can
develop and prosper. BACKGROUND
5.
The end of the cold war brought about a reflection on the future orientation of
the Canadian Forces and the role it might play in defending Canadian interests.
Concurrently, DND budget cuts forced military institutions to downsize
and reengineer their processes. To make matters worse all this was happening as
the operational tempo was increasing. Add to this the evolving geo-political
environment and the major internal changes, which affect us directly we can
certainly appreciate the complexity. 6.
All COs which have commanded or do command Light Infantry Battalion (LIB)
since their creation, after disbanding the CAR, followed the implementation
directives given by LFC. These
directives stipulated that the LIB should “focus
training on company and battalion light scale foot-borne operations, stressing
physical fitness and small arms and support weapons training, and on achieving
proficiency in airmobile operations.”
Each 7.
To maintain the light capability and the associated basic fundamental
infantry fighting skilset that has always existed in the army it is essential to
retain the LIB concept. In doing so the army can better fulfil the following
capabilities : a.
maintaining
a multi-purpose combat capable Army.
This objective is the “raison d’être” of the Army.
We need to maintain flexible force structure that will allow us to
participate in all theatres of operations and through the entire spectrum of
conflict. For instance, the light
force mentality allowed the army land component to prevail in b.
maintaining
a rapid deployment capability.
Given the very limited availibility of dedicated air transport assets in c.
maintaining
a training environment that will foster the development of core fighting skills,
develop leaders capable of focusing on troops handling.
This is probably the most important aspect for retaining a light infantry
capability. In a mechanized or
motorized environment
focus will remain on maintaining equipment and associated platform skilsets. As
discussed earlier the LAV III and will require will maintenance and training
time placing yet another burden on an already overtasked NCO and officer corps.
Time devoted to maintaining basic and fundamental infantry fighting skill
will invariably suffer in LAV units.
Therefore, time allocated to develop the basic skills of the infantryman
and the leadership abilities of the junior leaders (officers and NCOs) will be
reduce in a mechanized environment; and d.
maintaining
a training environment where the infantryman is capable of developing skills,
such as marksmanship, close combat, field craft, will, and teamwork.
The training that will be conducted will be adapted to the troops.
Militia units will be able to concentrate on the basics of infantry,
while their regular force counterparts will be able to develop more advance
capabilities based on previous experiences.
Light Infantry as a training medium represent the key to develop the
infantryman of the future. It can
develop the basic and advance skills and it is the most cost effective means to
meet the expectations of the Army while giving the flexibility to the leadership
to implement training plans within the actual budget capacity at all levels. 8.
Before beginning the argument, it is important to define terms that will
ensure a common understanding amongst all who share an interest in the subject: a.
Light
Infantry:
Infantry equipped lightly to perform effectively in a low or medium intensity
environment; b.
Dismounted
Infantry:
Infantry troops that have dismounted from their troop carrier.
It can also relate to units that do not have an integral lift capacity of
deploying themselves; and c.
Specialized
Infantry:
Infantry tasks, such as airborne, airmobile, mountain and amphibious.
These tasks can be assigned permanently or temporarily to a unit. The
arguments, which follows are intended to support the underlying reasons for
retaining a light infantry capacity within the existing LFC stucture. OPERATIONAL
REQUIREMENT
9.
“Light
Infantry units differ from other units in that they are habitually employed in
close, restrictive terrain. The
close-in fight on urban terrain is perfectly suited to Light Infantry units.
Their tactics are a combination of multiple, small-unit operations that
capitalise on surprise and attacks on the flanks and rear of the enemy.
Foul weather and night operations are the forte of light infantrymen.
They strike at key elements of the enemy to disorganise and piecemeal
him, and then finish him off.”[1] 10.
Careful study of the spectrum of conflict will point to situations where
LIB or light organisation will prevail. It
could be further argue that some of the most recent CF operations were light to
very light capability oriented, 10.
It
is well recognised that light infantry is ideally suited for
conducting/participating in: a.
Conduct
offensive and defensive operations; b.
Conduct
independent small-units operations; c.
Conduct
air assault operations; d.
Conduct
rear area operations; e.
Participate
in amphibious operations; f.
Operate
in conjunction with heavy forces; g.
Conduct
FIBUA operations; and h.
Participate
in peace support operations. 11.
Given their structure, the LIB provides the basis for more rapidly
deployable forces. Light units can
be more rapidly deployed than heavier units in a new “Theatre of Operations”
with a minimum of logistical support. Therefore,
allowing the necessary build-up with follow-on forces, which can be heavier.
Typically, LIB should act as the vanguard for any UN or NATO operation involving
the CF. 12.
The orientation given to the LIB by LFC allows the development of light
forces, which will be more effective than the CAR.
All COs that commanded LIBs have expanded their training plan to develop
interest and motivation in their troops. The
actions taken did increase unit cohesion, giving the young officers a unique
opportunity of developing the necessary leadership skills required in operations
and allowing to solve partially the problem identify by Maj Shelley in a paper
published in Canadian Defence Quaterly in 1996[2].
Heavy units have less opportunity to develop their young leaders.
Given they are equipment driven, maintenance becomes a priority taking
much of the available collective and individual training time. TRAINING
REQUIREMENT
13.
Development
and maintenance of basic core combat skills is probably the most important
reason for retaining the LIB in the CF Order of Battle. They provide the
regimental focus for development and maintenance of core leadership and combat
skills required by infantry units of any form. Focus is on, developing soldier
skills as opposed to platform related skills. It is the ideal organisation to
foster the development of marksmanship,
field craft, willpower, teamwork, physical fitness and endurance.
Light training is known as being tougher.
A continuous rotation of personnel amongst motorised and light units will
ensure that all newly promoted members will be employed in the LIB environment
in order to develop these new skills. Therefore,
the career of a NCOs may look like: a.
2
years in a LIB as Pte; b.
3
years as Pte/Cpl in a mechanized unit; c.
ISCC
and promoted to Mcpl; d.
2
years in a LIB; e.
3
years in a mechanized units; f.
promoted
to Sgt; g.
2
years in a LIB; h.
4
years in a mechanized units; i.
QL6B
and promoted to WO; j.
2
years in a LIB; and k.
4
years in a mechanized unit. 14.
For officers a similar template can be developed, and such template will
look like:
15.
This model will allow every member of the corps to have a good
understanding of both environments, allowing everyone to obtain the light
experience required to develop the leadership skills in human resources driven
organisation. 16.
For Militia units the advantage will be to fall back on a doctrine which
is applicable and realistic given the limited resources available.
Moreover, it will provide a spectrum of training that will focus on the
basis of the infantry while offering a challenging medium that can only help to
increase retention. Militia units
will be able to focus their training on platoon and section within a doctrinal
approach given the nature of Light Infantry.
A training spectrum may look like: a.
first
year: offensive operations to include advance to contact, attacks, patrolling; b.
second
year: defensive operations to include defence, delaying operations, withdrawal,
patrolling; and c.
third
year: special operations to include FIBUA and patrolling. 17.
This spectrum covers all necessary subjects to prepare Militia members to
reinforce Regular force units deployed on UN or NATO tasks.
Patrolling covers all elements of fieldcraft. 18.
Training is one advantage to maintaining a Light Infantry capability in
the Army. It is cheaper than a
mechanised unit and will contribute to develop leaders that will be able to face
the challenges of tomorrow. COPING
WITH THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE
19.
Dealing with the “Revolution in Military Affairs” will contribute to
enhance the need for several professional discussions on different topics.
As underlined by Dr Robertson[3]
the structural changes that are ongoing at present in the Western world will
need to be met with innovative means. Changes
undertook by the Germans in the 30’s is a reliable example.
Germans had a conceptual approach, the Allies had a technological
approach to break the stalemate of 1914-18.
While the British and the French were developing the tank, the Germans
were implementing the “Stormtrooper” tactic.
This gave them the advantage of being able to learn lessons from the
conflict. They were able to
challenge their concept and adapt the technological development to it.
They were opened minded and ready to study any other idea.
Fuller and De Gaulle had written essays on the employment of tanks in the
field. Guderian did read what they
wrote and adapted it to the Wehrmacht. The
French and British High Command refused to consider the use of tanks in any
other fashion then the doctrinal approach that they had at the moment.
The rest of the story is well known, it took the Allies five (5) years of
hard combat to defeat the Germans. Having
the Allies taken the opportunity to debate the issues of tank warfare for
instance, the outcome of Second World War would have been quite different. 20.
Discussions are only beginning but it seems that the results are already
known. Unfortunately,
our experience reinforces the notion that history often tends to reapeat itself.
This is a notion that withstood the test of time and the military is in
no way sheltered from the reality. The
Cold War and the Gulf War have demonstrated the need and the use of a mechanised
force to face a probable enemy. This
need is still required. However,
asymmetric conflicts are recognised to be the threats of the future.
Therefore, the design force to cope with this threat must contain all
necessary capacities to meet the adversaries.
Light Infantry will only enhance our ability to cope with the “New
World Order”. Moreover, adding
such capabilities in our Canadian Brigade Groups will give the Commanders an
additional asset. The LIB will be
able to be project using aviation and air assets.
This approach will strengthened the doctrine with our principal ally, the
21.
The LIB is supporting the VCDS strategic capability planning in all the
area identified: a.
Capability
Area 1- Tactical command:
LIB is flexible enough to allow C4I in a multitude of different environment; b.
Capability
Area 2- Tactical Information and Intelligence:
Structural design of the LIB allows the Commanders to meet needs in this
capacity; c.
Capability
Area 3- Conduct Tactical level Operations: LIB
is able to conduct operations within this area of responsibility; d.
Capability
Area 4- Operational and Tactical Mobility: LIB
will allow the CF to deploy rapidly in any given Operational Theatre; e.
Capability
Area 5- Strategic, Operational and Tactical Protect Forces:
LIB can be used to protect Canadian Forces and interests. f.
Capability
Area 6-Tactical Level Sustainment:
LIB can sustain themselves as every other units depending of the support given
in theatre; g.
Capability
Area 7- Military Strategic, Operational and Tactical Force Generation:
Light Infantry in the Militia will meet this capability at the strategical and
operational level. LIB in service in
the Regular force will meet the capability at operational and tactical level;
and h.
Capability
Area 8- Co-ordination with other Government initiatives:
LIB will maintain all interactions necessary with other departments, NGOs or any
other stakeholders as tasked. Militia
units will continue to ensure a viable link between the military and civilian
community. 22.
Respecting these capabilities is of the utmost importance, capacity that
will be retain for the “Army of Tomorrow” needs to be required for the
“Army of the Future”. Light
Infantry will allow LFC to cope with the challenges to come in giving the Army a
capacity enhancing its flexibility. RECOMMENDATIONS
23.
It is recommended to retain a Light Infantry capacity within both
component of the Army. As
demonstrated in this paper, Light Infantry is one of the capacities that will
enable the Army to meet rapidly any situation.
It is expanding the CF capability to deploy sizeable forces to meet
Canadian commitment domestically and internationally. 24.
Light Infantry will enhance our operational capabilities in giving the
Army Commander a capacity that is rapidly deployable in a given theatre.
It can be used as a first unit to go in a particular operations,
therefore, gaining time to send heavier units. 25.
Light Infantry will enhance our training capabilities in allowing the
Army to develop better junior leaders. It
will also permit the Militia units to cope with the tasks at hand in giving them
tools that will focus their training on the basic aspects of the infantry trade,
while giving tem a dynamic environment to evolve in.
Regular forces units will be able to develop all qualities and skills
required in the Infantry within a challenging training plan. 26.
Light Infantry was always part of the “Order of Battle”, and it will
be a mistake to specialized our units only in mechanized infantry.
Moreover, such a path logically is calling to equip, or give the Militia
unit’s opportunity to train with, with LAV III.
It is known that LFC does not intend to take this path.
Therefore, it will not be motivating to be part of a Militia Infantry
unit’s. Retention will decrease
and at the end everyone will loose. The
operational tempo is demanding, and Militia sends NCMs to operations with units
deployed in different theatre. Light
Infantry will enhance training, proposing challenges to the troops and prepare
adequately the NCMs selected to be deployed with units tasked to undertake
rotations in UN or NATO operations that CONCLUSION
27.
Strategy 2020 in designing the CF structure of the future has identified
attributes that will be required to cope with the challenges that we are going
to face. These attributes can be met
by Light Infantry capacity. Objectives
elaborated in the vision statement sustain LIB’s utilisation as follow: a.
objective
1- innovative path:
flexibility given by LIB will have an added-value to the CF operational
capabilities; b.
objective
2- decisive leaders:
the characteristics of Light Infantry will allow to develop junior leader’s
initiative, decisiveness, self-confidence, and management techniques; c.
objective
3- modernize:
communications systems and other recent acquisition have shown that it is
possible to modernize LIB. Moreover,
it is not costly and maintaining that capabilities will aligned us on our allies
force struture’s; d.
objective
4- globally deployable:
as discussed LIB are highly deployable; e.
objective
5- interoperable:
as discussed LIB are highly interoperable; f.
objective
6- career of choice:
maintaining the LIB structure will enhance career within the Infantry Corps, in
increasing the challenges to overcome; g.
objective
7- strategic partnership:
utilisation of LIB will allow the CF to develop its existing partnership in
demonstrating a greater flexibility in responding; and h.
objective
8- resource stewardship:
LIB will allow the CF to meet their objective in this capacity in increasing the
rapidity and effectiveness with which the Army will respond. 28.
CDA reports of last September 27th concludes in stressing the following
points: a.
the
new environment that b.
there
is a need to develop a multi-purpose capable combat force; c.
d.
¸there
is a need to reorganise the structure, especially the Army. Given
all the previous argument, Light Infantry can play an important role in the
“Army of the Future”, it will represent a corner stone of the training
program to develop professional officers, NCO’s and NCM’s, that will
undertake the challenges to come. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books Light
Infantry Platoon/Squad. FM
7-70. Headquarters, Department of
the Army. Light
Infantry Battalion.
FM 7-72. Headquarters,
Department of the Army. Light
Infantry Company.
FM 7-71. Headquarters,
Department of the Army. Leonard,
Robert. The
Art of Maneuver. Maneuver- Warfare
Theory and Airland Battle. Presidio
Press. Studies
& related staff works CDS-
DM Strategy 2020.
Web sites: http://vcds.dnd.ca/cds/strategy2k Strategic
capability planning.
http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/dda/strat Report
presented by the Congress of Defence Association to the public in September
2000. 3
PPCLI 4500-2(CO) June 1997 LFC
3290-1 (COS) Magazines Dr.
Akhras, Georges. “Smart
Materials and Smart Systems for the Future.” Canadian Military Journal.
Volume 1, No. 3, Autumn 2000. pp.
25- 31. |
L'ASSOCIATION
CANADIENNE DE L'INFANTERIE/
CANADIAN INFANTRY ASSOCIATION
