Come On!

The Concise Oxford Dictionary

Ninth Edition, 1995

Ask an ancient greenjacket, fifth of five generations of infantry officers in Canada, whether there should be a combat doctrine for light infantry and expect a biased answer.

An answer spontaneously predisposed and prejudiced toward infantry as the basic, indispensable fighting arm of any army, with fighting as its ultimate vocation, whatever avocational taskings may be thrust upon it in peace and war, however prolonged they may be.

An answer urging Canadian infantry, mercenary and volunteer, to be true to itself, false to no man: foe, friend, taxpayer…

…and, for so long as it serves and remains true to it colors and drums, to practice, prepare for, think war, that inextinguishable social phenomenon that lurks permanently just over the horizon, crouched to spring murderously on the unwary, including, as history shows us so vividly, complacent, cosseted, cosy soldiery.

Infantry, with all the support it can get from allies, its fellow arms and services, its homeland, is for holding the ground it stands on and for taking the ground on which stands the enemy.

When attacking enemy infantry reaches the localities friendly infantry is defending, sheltered from fire in its trenches, there is mutual killing with light arms until the battle is decided. Unless it calls its own artillery down on itself, the defending infantry fights alone: patiently, properly, proudly immobile – until it rises up in counter-attack and pursuit.

Now, in these offensive phases, against a defeated, discouraged, disorganized foe, it calls on every means of mobility at hand to move decisively, surprisingly, swiftly: instead of earth, it shelters behind armour, including its own APC's and MICV's and the agile, intrusive, protected covering firepower of self-propelled artillery, attack helicopters, tanks: the coordinated panoply of the ideal war of movement.

But ideals come and go in warfare.

The pursued stiffen; as exhaustion takes its toll, logistics falter, losses mount, the rapture of pursuit dies away and caution slows and stops the pursuers.

The opposing infantry dig themselves in and hold: and defence, as is its wont, gives pause to both sides, to catch their breath, dream up attack, re-muster their strength.

Out in front once more are the opposing infantries, busy making themselves as immobile as possible.

By definition, and the nature of their trade, good infantry remain "soldiers who march and fight on foot".

(The most human of soldierly types, infantry share the predilection to seek distinction in idiosyncrasies, nomenclature, special status: call it regimentalism, separatism, tribalism, it has its place in war as a positive moral factor, but, when carried to extremes as it often is, results as well in disintegration, distrust, disunity. Such negative distinction splits the infantry into impractical, isolated, specialist entities, where its universal warlike application calls for emphasis on its dictionary definition and close-quarter fighting nature. Airborne infantry, armoured infantry, commandos, marine infantry, mountain infantry and so on exhibit an unearned elitism that tends to leave them out of battle until their chosen, exclusive, narrow roles happen to pop up, in the meantime stealing from the mass that is called onto fight in all conditions, the cream of leadership potential. Look closely and all these nominal varieties of infantry, when they leave their conveyances, fight in the same way – light – and so they must. Ambidexterity, even a kind of hermaphroditism, should distinguish the infantry: where combat calls, the infantry must always go – but in step with itself.)

When the lessons of the Boer War made mounted infantry the mode, did its longer range mobility increase? Only marginally, as marching men are more enduring than horses. But, when it fought, its power was dramatically decreased, as so many of its men led horses to the rear. When 4CIBG went motorized in the latter 1950's, with no increase in manpower, each infantry battalion went to about a hundred vehicles and lost one hundred drivers when it encountered the enemy. In both cases, mounted infantry fought dismounted, deprived of many bayonets.

What does "heavy infantry" really imply? Vehicles of one kind or another. What else?

If the vehicle is a ship, it will disembark light Canadian infantry, as will a transport aircraft.

If a helicopter, in the Arctic or elsewhere, the same.

If an enemy knows his mountains, he will chew anything but light infantry to pieces.

If infantry fights in built-up areas, it will fight and move not only on foot, but on its bellies and knees.

If infantry is called upon to fight in forests or jungle, vehicles will, for the most part, hinder its progress.

If infantry fights by stealth under cover of fog, night or smoke, it may even leave its helmets behind.

If infantry drops, if only for old sakes's sake, by parachute, it will fight ultra-light.

And if mobilization is as slow as its planning by professionals is today, the first several Canadian divisions sent to war will be light and if extremis comes early, will fight in the main battle as such.

No one can deny that infantry under armour will advance and retreat more safely, particularly under air attack.

Or that when advance hardens into attack, the approach under armour won't be more secure until comes time to dismount.

But the pay-off of advance and attack, the final outcome, comes in the assault: the assault to which, in doctrine, practice and training, the Canadian Army pays little or no attention, possibly because, when all the manouevre is complete, the officers' job is done, except to draw pistols and perhaps make semi-suicidal gestures, urging their men on by visible example, when voices can no longer be heard or heeded in the frenzy and the fury.

Having been led into the assault, the sections go at it in functional quarantine: at arm’s length, grenading, shooting point-blank, stabbing, throttling; directed at best by their section and detachment commanders, (corporals restored, if common sense prevails, to the dignity and prestige of command), mouthing, pointing, waving.

The close support fighters and bombers will be off interdicting. The guns won’t be there, having lifted. The attack helicopters will be behind, using cover and firing at longest possible range. The tanks, afraid of enemy infantry around them and unlikely to find a handy open flank, will be looking after themselves. There may be some sappers doing their dangerous thing, but seem to have passed the assault to infantry pioneers.

Infantry in the assault will be alone in the most extreme sense: entirely self-reliant, almost as individuals. This is the apogee of their sublime calling: and at that apogee they are light to the extent of total dependence on their hands, heads and hearts and on the light arms and armaments they can carry on their persons, while remaining, like boxers, quick enough on their feet to stay alive and kill, hand-to-hand; to use as bravely, effectively, lethally as they have been – or should have been – inspirited and taught to use, their most basic instruments.

Which brings the argument to doctrine.

If there is any doubt about teaching Canadian infantry that they will actually fight light, however they may be supported and transported, what are they being taught about fighting beyond fortifying and manoeuvring?

In advance and retreat they are secondary players, in attack and defence primary. A complete, honest doctrine must make this clear to all concerned: deviant, private doctrines, inimical to team success, must be ruthlessly expunged whenever they crop up, as crop up they do, to be benignly tolerated in a mistaken interpretation of that weakest of Canadian Principles of War: Co-operation.

Doctrine must build on history, record and tradition, basically Canadian, but wholly appropriate to the Canadian way of war – which way is available through concentrated study to anyone conscientious, intelligent and perceptive enough to seriously seek it out and adapt it to the present and foreseeable future.

Laying out doctrine in detail is seen as going beyond the scope of the question asked of this author – who would be glad to engage in forthright discussion, verbally or in writing: try him.

A couple of peripheral points.

If armour refuses to manouevre without direct infantry protection, then separate such protective elements from the infantry and put them permanently into black berets and armoured establishments. The Israelis, after all, have designed tanks to carry such elements as a part of crews. If such a measure is seen as extreme, then build black-bereted protection squadrons into regimental establishments.

To extend this concept of direct protection, where it is considered permanently necessary, build similar elements into all establishments concerned, including headquarters, as integral to them.

What happens now, in operations, is that infantry, in deployed formations and units, is called upon, usually at immediate or short notice, to discombobulate its already difficult and stretched dispositions to provide protection all over the battlefield, making a dangerous farce of otherwise carefully thought out doctrine, establishments and organization and their apparent relationships.

Extending the concept of protection rearward along the lines of communication to the Home Base – Canada – there is good reason to see the infantry formations and units required as all-female, thus massively increasing available manpower.

If lift in APC’s and MICV’s is too expensive in cost, fuel, maintenance and mobilization time to equip all combat infantry, then can it become a formation resource, adequate for, say, one quarter of the infantry at any given juncture?

Finally, in peacetime, seated in front of computer screens vice out in the open, will operations and tactics and all their concomitants, become academic, sterile and tedious: worse still, unrealistic?

Canadian infantry, regular and reserve should be out in the field, even if the field is the city block beside the armoury, summer and winter, rain and shine, ever practicing their art of war as it will be fought.

We have our coastline, our conurbations, our forests, our mountains, our snows – all neglected as sites for training infantry, which alone can fight effectively in them and all of which are challenging and exciting to the ethos and imagination.

And how usefully do we use the all-too-familiar training ground of Gagetown, Petawawa, Valcartier, Wainwright if, when it comes to the assault, we line up the live-firing companies, dress them by the right and tramp forward as at Balaclava, obeying the inspiring command, "Bullets!" - or have we given that up, too?

Of course the Canadian Army needs a doctrine for light infantry: come the crunch, that’s what all infantry is.

Emotional, passionate, sanguine? You can bet your life on it!

Be smug about combat readiness, be sure that Canadians can get by in action on innate aptitude; draw false conclusions from the successes of avocations, however arduous and risk defeat when war comes again to Canada.

Be a self-designated military expert without proof; be self-satisfied without being tested; be self-important about ones’ soldiering without cause and, when cast into battle, spill the blood of Canadian soldiers by character faults as deadly as friendly fire.

Cheers!

Kip

(C.de L. Kirby)

 Brigadier-General

9 November 2000

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