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DOES CANADA NEED A NEW WHITE PAPER? By LGen Charles H. Belzile (retd), Past President of CIA and Chariman of CDA

From: LCol (retd) J.A.K. McCuaig, CD, CIA Secretary-Treasurer
Date: 13 Feb 2001
Time: 14:32:54

Comments

'The following is a paper presented by LGen Charles H.Belzile (retired), a Past-President of CIA and Chairman of CDA, at the recent Canada's Security and Defence Policy Conference held recently at the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg. (Note: The issue will be discussed 'inter alia' during the CDA AGM syndicate discussions).'

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL CHARLES BELZILE (RETD) CHAIRMAN, CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS PRESENTATION TO CANADA'S SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY CONFERENCE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA 1 – 3 FEBRUARY 2001 (Amended – 10 Feb 01)

DOES CANADA NEED A NEW WHITE PAPER?

Introduction

GOOD MORNING LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, IT IS MY PLEASURE TO TAKE PART IN THIS CONFERENCE AND TO WORK WITH ITS DISTINGUISHED PARTICIPANTS TO ANALYSE A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES. MY THANKS AND CONGRATULATIONS ARE EXTENDED TO THE ORGANIZERS FOR AN EXCELLENT CONFERENCE.

I AM ALSO PLEASED TO SPEAK ON A SEMINAL TOPIC – THAT IS, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER CANADA NEEDS AN IN-DEPTH REVIEW OF DEFENCE AT THIS TIME? OBVIOUSLY ONE MUST GET THE POLICY RIGHT BEFORE UNDERTAKING TO BUILD AND MAINTAIN A VIABLE DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENT TO SERVE NATIONAL INTERESTS. ONCE THAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED, IT IS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE THE RESOURCES TO IMPLEMENT THE POLICY. AS WE ALL KNOW TOO WELL, IT IS AT THAT POINT CANADIAN DEFENCE AFFAIRS HAVE COME UNSTUCK OVER THE PAST THIRTY YEARS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE FOR THE 1994 WHITE PAPER. IT WAS A GOOD POLICY DOCUMENT, ESPECIALLY IN ITS SUPPORT FOR COMBAT CAPABLE ARMED FORCES. HOWEVER, MASSIVE REDUCTIONS OF DEFENCE SPENDING IN THE YEARS FOLLOWING ITS PUBLICATION HAVE SEVERELY LIMITED ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

EVEN THE INCREASES IN BUDGETS 1999 AND 2000 HAVE BEEN INSUFFICIENT TO DO MORE THAN SLOW THE RATE OF DECLINE. THEY MET ONLY 50% OF THE REQUIREMENT. OVERALL, CANADIAN FORCES CAPABILITIES CONTINUE TO FALL, BUT NOT QUITE AS STEEPLY AS BEFORE. THIS MEANS THAT EARLY IN THE GAME WE MUST FACE THE FACT LACK OF MONEY REMAINS THE PRIMARY AND PERSISTENT DRIVER OF CRISIS IN CANADIAN DEFENCE AFFAIRS.

HENCE, THE MAIN CONSIDERATION IN ANSWERING THE QUESTION FACED BY THIS PANEL IS THAT A NEW WHITE PAPER MUST NOT BECOME AN INSTRUMENT TO LEGITIMIZE OR RATIONALIZE THE UNSATISFACTORY STATUS QUO. THAT IS, IT MUST NOT PRODUCE ARMED FORCES SIMPLY TO FIT THE CURRENT FUNDING ENVELOPE, RATHER THAN WHAT IS NEEDED TO GUARD OUR SECURITY AND PROSPERITY. TO DO OTHERWISE PUTS THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE.

BUT OTHERS WILL SAY THAT FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE FUNDING LIMITATIONS AS THE DEFINING FACTOR IN OUR ANALYSIS MEANS THE WHOLE EXERCISE WOULD BE A WASTE OF TIME. NEEDLESS TO SAY I DISAGREE STRONGLY WITH THAT THESIS. RATHER, I WOULD PROPOSE A MEETING OF THE MINDS. WE MUST NOT COMPROMISE THE REQUIREMENTS OF CANADIAN NATIONALSECURITY, BUT WE SHOULD ALSO DEVISE A DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENT THAT COMBINES ECONOMY, EFFECTIVENESS AND CREDIBILITY.

HAVING PROPOSED A REASONABLY SUFFICIENT DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENT, IT THEN BECOMES THE JOB OF IMPORTANT PLAYERS SUCH AS THE CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS, WHICH I REPRESENT, AND OTHER PRO-DEFENCE ORGANIZATIONS, TO CONVINCE THE GOVERNMENT TO COME UP WITH THE MONEY TO MAKE IT WORK. THE MODEST INCREASES IN BUDGETS 99 AND 00 SHOW THAT THIS IS NOT A HOPELESS PROPOSITION -- DESPITE GETTING MERELY A “PAT ON THE BACK” IN THE SPEECH FROM THE THRONE.

WITH ALL THIS IN MIND I BELIEVE THERE ARE THREE OPTIONS FACING THE GOVERNMENT TODAY WITH RESPECT TO DEFENCE. THEY ARE:

 PROVIDE THE MONEY REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT WHITE PAPER '94. (ESTIMATES VARY. $500M/YR TO STOP RUST-OUT (CDA). $650M/YR (DND). $750M - $1B/YR (AUDITOR-GENERAL -- INCLUDES CAPITAL)

 CONDUCT A NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW, COMPRISING BOTH FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY, CULMINATING IN A NEW WHITE PAPER, BUT WITH A FUNDING GUARANTEE. (NOTE NATIONAL SECURITY INCLUDES FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND POLICE AGENCIES).

 CONDUCT A PROGRAM REVIEW BASED ON THE EXISTING SITUATION, AND THE CURRENT LEVEL OF FUNDING. IT IS WORTH NOTING HERE THE LEAD TIMES REQUIRED IF WE TAKE THE WRONG ROUTE.

I SHALL ADDRESS THESE OPTIONS, BUT FIRST I WOULD LIKE TO RECALL THE BACKGROUND OF THE 1994 WHITE, PAPER TO ESTABLISH THE CONTEXT FOR DEFENCE POLICY STUDIES IN CANADA. IT WOULD THEN BE USEFUL TO ANALYSE THAT DOCUMENT, AS A PRELUDE TO CONSIDERING THE NEED FOR, AND THE CONTENTS OF, A NEW ONE.

Background

AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR A FIERCE COMPETITION OCCURRED IN CANADA BETWEEN THOSE WHO WISHED TO REHABILITATE AND MODERNIZE THE CANADIAN FORCES VERSUS THOSE WHO WERE DETERMINED TO CONTINUE TO DOWNGRADE THEM UNDER THE GUISE OF REAPING A SO-CALLED PEACE DIVIDEND. THE ANTI-DEFENCE FORCES COMPRISED MEMBERS OF A STILL STRONG AND INFLUENTIAL PEACE MOVEMENT, OFFICIALS DEDICATED TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LINGERING TRUDEAU AGENDA FOR RADICAL DEFENCE CHANGE, AND STILL OTHER OFFICIALS WHO SAW THE APPROACHING FISCAL CRISIS CAUSED BY SEVERAL DECADES OF GOVERNMENT OVERSPENDING.

THE IMMEDIATE RESULT WAS TO CUT THE GROUND OUT FROM UNDER THE AMBITIOUS 1987 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER. THE MOST VISIBLE IMPACTS WERE THE WITHDRAWAL OF CANADIAN FORCES FROM EUROPE, AND ELIMINATION OF PLANNED INCREASES TO THE DND BUDGET

MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE ANTI-DEFENCE PLAYERS USED THE END OF THE COLD WAR AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROMOTE THEIR VIEWS INTO POLICY WITHOUT PUBLIC DEBATE. THEY MADE THEIR STRONGEST MOVES IN THE WELL-PUBLICIZED PROPOSALS FOR REDUCED DEFENCE, AND A FOCUS ON PEACEKEEPING, FOUND IN THE CANADA 21 REPORT. THEY ALSO HAD SIMILAR POLICY INCLUDED IN THE LIBERAL PARTY RED BOOK PREPARED FOR THE 1993 ELECTION. THESE ARE THE ORIGINS OF BOTH HUMAN SECURITY AND SOFT POWER ASSOCIATED WITH THE AXWORTHY YEARS.

SHORTLY AFTER THE ELECTION, THE NEW CHRETIEN GOVERNMENT CONVENED TWO SPECIAL JOINT PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES TO REVIEW CANADA'S DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICIES. THE ANTI-DEFENCE COMMUNITY ASSUMED THAT THIS PROCESS WOULD RUBBER STAMP ITS PROPOSALS TO REDUCE CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE. IN THE EVENT THIS OCCURRED WITH THE FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW, WHICH BECAME A FOCUS FOR HUMAN SECURITY.

FOR THE DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW THERE WAS A DIFFERENT OUTCOME. THERE, THE ONSLAUGHT OF THE ACTIVISTS WAS MET BY A DETERMINED GROUP OF PEOPLE WHO PRESENTED STRONG CASES IN SUPPORT OF CONTINUATION OF CANADIAN INTERNATIONALISM, AND RETENTION OF COMBAT-CAPABLE ARMED FORCES. TWO ORGANIZATIONS WERE PROMINENT IN ARGUING THE PRO-DEFENCE CASE: THE COMMITTEE OF THIRTEEN, ON WHICH I SERVED, AND THE CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS. IN THE END WE WON OUR CASE FOR COMBAT CAPABILITY, BUT LOST THE BATTLE FOR ADEQUATE DEFENCE FUNDING TO SUPPORT IT.

The Nature of the Challenge

I MENTION ALL OF THIS SO YOU WILL BE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT WHAT COULD OCCUR DURING ANOTHER DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW LEADING TO A NEW WHITE PAPER. THIS TIME WE MIGHT NOT BE AS SUCCESSFUL

MOREOVER, THE ANTI-DEFENCE SIDE WOULD BE AIDED BY A PUBLIC WHICH HAS EITHER BOUGHT THE ANTI-DEFENCE MESSAGE, OR DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION IN THE FIRST PLACE. POLLS SHOW THAT WHEREAS 80% BELIEVE THE CANADIAN FORCES ARE DOING A GOOD JOB, LESS THAN 20% SUPPORT INVESTING MORE MONEY TO MAKE THEM MODERN AND EFFECTIVE. THIS PROBLEM IS MORE PRONOUNCED IN CANADA THAN IN OTHER COUNTRIES BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF OUR POLITICAL HISTORY OVER THE PAST THIRTY YEARS. CONTRAST THIS WITH THE WORDS OF NEWLY-ELECTED PRESIDENT BUSH REGARDING THE NEED FOR STRONG DEFENCE – AND AMERICAN PUBLIC RESPONSE WHICH SUPPORTS HIM.

THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN PRO AND ANTI DEFENCE VIEWS OVER THE USE OF ARMED FORCES IS VISIBLE IN THE POSITIONS OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND OF NATIONAL DEFENCE. HOWEVER, IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT THERE MUST BE A CONVERGENCE BETWEEN THE TWO IN ORDER TO PRODUCE A COHERENT AND BENEFICIAL NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY. A RECENTLY PUBLISHED ARTICLE BY DOCTOR DOUGLAS BLAND OF QUEENS' UNIVERSITY TREATS THIS REQUIREMENT IN VERY COMPETENT FASHION. I HAVE COPIES AVAILABLE FOR THOSE INTERESTED.

The Australian Example

IF THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT DECIDES TO UNDERTAKE A DEFENCE REVIEW AND PRODUCE ANOTHER WHITE PAPER, IT COULD PROFIT BY USING THE AUSTRALIANS AS AN EXAMPLE. THEY HAVE JUST PUBLISHED A NEW WHITE PAPER, AND IT IS A WELL CONCEIVED AND PRESENTED DOCUMENT. COINCIDENTALY, THEIR LAST WHITE PAPER ALSO DATES FROM 1994.

THE AUSTRALIANS HAVE UNDERTAKEN A REALISTIC STRATEGIC REVIEW AND APPLIED IT TO THEIR SITUATION. THEY THEN COORDINATE BOTH THE FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENCE POLICY ASPECTS TO ELIMINATE THE COMPETITION IN THESE AREAS THAT HAS CONFUSED THE ISSUE IN CANADA. I SHOULD ALSO MENTION THAT THE AUSTRALIAN REVIEW WAS PROMPTED BY A CRISIS IN DEFENCE, NOT UNLIKE THE SITUATION IN CANADA.

THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WAS SIMPLY NOT ENOUGH MONEY BUDGETED FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF EXISTING CAPABILITIES AND THE ACQUISITION OF NEW CAPABILITIES. AT CURRENT SPENDING LEVELS, SOMETHING HAD TO GIVE. CAPABILITIES HAD EITHER TO BE REDUCED OR GIVEN UP.

MOREOVER, THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT SAW THAT THE OPERATIONAL TEMPO OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE -- BOTH CURRENTLY AND IN THE FUTURE -- COULD NOT BE SUSTAINED WITHOUT AN INJECTION OF FUNDS. IT ALSO KNEW THAT ANY INCREASE IN FUNDS ALLOCATED TO DEFENCE WOULD COME AT A COST -- EITHER TO THE BUDGET SURPLUS OR TO OTHER PROGRAMS.

SO IT EMBARKED ON THE PREPARATION OF A NEW WHITE PAPER TO EXPLAIN TO THE AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC EXACTLY WHAT PROBLEMS IT FACED AND HOW TO DEAL WITH THEM. IN THIS WAY IT BROUGHT THE PUBLIC ON-SIDE, AND WAS ABLE TO PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL $A23.5 BILLION OVER THE NEXT DECADE. THIS DEMONSTRATES HOW THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT WAS SUCCESSFUL IN HANDLING BOTH THE POLITICS OF THE PROBLEM, AND THE NEEDS OF DEFENCE.

ALL OF THIS TRACKS WITH THE CANADIAN SITUATION, WITH ONE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE. THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER RECOGNIZED THAT HE HAD A CRISIS ON HIS HANDS, AND IT COULD PROVE TO BE POLITICALLY DAMAGING. HE THEN ACTED DECISIVELY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM

MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS CONCURRENTLY APPROVED NEW FUNDING, MAINLY FOR CAPITAL PROJECTS, TO IMPLEMENT THE NEW WHITE PAPER. UNFORTUNATELY, THAT WOULD LIKELY BE THE FEATURE THAT WOULD BE MOST UNPOPULAR WITH A CANADIAN GOVERNMENT.

The 1994 White Paper in Review

I SHALL NOW PRESENT A SHORT REVIEW OF THE 1994 CANADIAN WHITE PAPER TO ASSIST IN ASSESSING WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A NEED TO PRODUCE A NEW ONE. MOST ANALYSTS AGREE THAT THE WHITE PAPER IS BASICALLY SOUND, BUT THAT THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT IT IS THE PROBLEM.

HOWEVER, BEYOND THE LACK OF FUNDING, THERE ARE SEVERAL VALID POINTS OF CRITICISM OF CONTENT. THE FIRST IS THAT THE DOCUMENT AVOIDS TREATING MAJOR WAR AS A POSSIBILITY IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THIS COULD BE TRUE, BUT THIS ASSUMPTION HAS PROVEN TO BE WRONG MANY TIMES IN THE PAST – MOST RECENTLY, THE GULF WAR. MOREOVER, ANOTHER MIDDLE EAST WAR COULD BREAK OUT TOMORROW OR NEXT WEEK. ALTHOUGH PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND SO-CALLED ASYMMETRIC THREATS DOMINATE THE SITUATION TODAY, MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WAR SHOULD NOT BE ELIMINATED FROM THE LIST OF POSSIBILITIES.

ONE GETS THE SENSE THAT THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WANT TO EXPAND THE THREAT SPECTRUM INTO HIGHER LEVELS OF COMBAT FOR REASONS OF COST AND AN IDEOLOGICAL RELUCTANCE TO ENGAGE IN CONVENTIONAL COMBAT OPERATIONS. FEAR OF CASUALTIES IS ALSO HIGH ON ITS LIST OF CONCERNS. NONETHELESS, MODERN ARMED FORCES FIELDED BY A LEADING INDUSTRIAL NATION MUST BE ABLE TO COVER THE BROAD SPECTRUM. EVEN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS REQUIRE ROBUST MILITARY FORCES, ACCORDING TO THE RECENTLY PUBLISHED BRAHIMI REPORT.

BEYOND THAT FUNDAMENTAL WEAKNESS THERE IS ALSO CONCERN OVER THE POLICY FOR COMMITTING CANADIAN FORCES TO OVERSEAS OPERATIONS AND THE SIZE OF THOSE COMMITMENTS. ASIDE FROM BEING AMBIGUOUS, IT UNDERVALUES COMMITMENTS TO NATO, NORAD AND OTHER BI-LATERAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES. IT GIVES THE IMPRESSION THAT ONLY THE UNITED NATIONS PLAYS A PROMINENT ROLE IN CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY. IT IS THEREFORE IRONIC THAT OUR LARGEST RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACEKEEPING HAVE BEEN TO NATO-LED FORCES IN BOSNIA AND KOSOVO -- NEITHER OF WHICH ARE UN BLUE BERET OPERATIONS.

THE WHITE PAPER IS ALSO CONFUSING OVER THE SIZE AND SCOPE OF CANADIAN OVERSEAS COMMITMENTS. ON THE ONE HAND, IN THE CASE OF THE ARMY, IT DESIGNATES A BRIGADE FOR CERTAIN PURPOSES, AND THEN SPEAKS OF ONE OR MORE INDEPENDENT BATTALION GROUPS THAT MAY OR MAY NOT BE DOUBLE TASKED. ABOVE ALL, THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO SUSTAINMENT OF DEPLOYED ELEMENTS, THEREFORE CALLING INTO QUESTION THE COMMITMENT TO MOBILIZATION ELSEWHERE IN THE DOCUMENT. IN TURN THIS PLACES THE RESERVES, AND ESPECIALLY THE MILITIA, IN LIMBO WITH RESPECT TO CONTRIBUTIONS BEYOND AUGMENTATION OF THE REGULAR FORCE.

FROM MY PERSPECTIVE, AS A FORMER COMMANDER OF THE ARMY, COMMITTING BATTALION GROUPS IS NOT GOOD ENOUGH. ONLY A BRIGADE GROUP CAN MAKE A CREDIBLE CONTRIBUTION AS AN IDENTIFIABLE CANADIAN ENTITY IN A COALITION FORCE. THE POLICY OF RELYING ON ALLIES FOR SUPPORT OF CANADIAN BATTALIONS IS NOT SATISFACTORY. IN THE BALKANS THERE WAS EVEN A REGRESSION BEYOND THAT. CANADIAN UNITS WERE BROKEN-UP AND SUB-UNITS PLACED UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF OTHER NATIONS. WE SPENT THE BETTER PART OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY ESTABLISHING A POLICY TO PREVENT THIS. IT IS AMAZING THAT THIS ISSUE WAS NEVER RAISED BY EITHER OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES OR THE MEDIA.

BEYOND THESE INTERNAL WEAKNESSES OF THE '94 WHITE PAPER, ONE COULD ALSO QUESTION WHETHER IT HAS BEEN OVERTAKEN BY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REALM OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, THAT IS, THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS. A RECENT DND DOCUMENT, STRATEGY 2020 IS DESIGNED IN PART TO ADDRESS THIS POSSIBILITY. IT CAN THEREFORE BE TAKEN AS AN APPENDAGE TO THE WHITE PAPER. PERHAPS THE TIME HAS COME TO INTEGRATE ITS CONTENTS MORE CLOSELY INTO A NEW POLICY REVIEW.

I WILL NOW DISCUSS SOME SALIENT FEATURES OF WHAT I CONSIDER TO BE IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, AND THEN MAKE A FEW COMMENTS ON THE MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT IT. I SHALL DRAW UPON RECENT STUDIES PERFORMED BY CDA, ESPECIALLY, STABILITY AND PROSPERITY, PUBLISHED IN SEPTEMBER 2000. I HAVE BROUGHT SOME COPIES TO THIS CONFERENCE. IT MAY ALSO BE DOWNLOADED FROM OUR WEBSITE, TOGETHER WITH A WIDE SELECTION OF OTHER MATERIAL ON DEFENCE TOPICS. (www.cda-cdai.ca)

The Question of National Security Policy

REFERRING AGAIN TO THE AUSTRALIAN WHITE PAPER, IT IS CLEAR THEY HAVE TAKEN THE SENSIBLE APPROACH OF COORDINATING FOREIGN POLICY WITH DEFENCE POLICY – UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY. IF A CANADIAN REVIEW IS UNDERTAKEN, THEN I WOULD URGE THE GOVERNMENT TO FOLLOW THE AUSTRALIAN APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY.

RECENT CHANGES AT THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY SHOULD HAVE A SALUTARY EFFECT ON THIS PROCESS. IT IS ALREADY APPARENT THAT THE PROFILE OF SOFT POWER AND HUMAN SECURITY IS BEGINNING TO SUBSIDE SOMEWHAT, AS THE IMPERATIVES RELATED TO FOREIGN TRADE APPEAR ON THE STAGE.

ONCE AGAIN, IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW BUSH ADMINISTRATION OUGHT TO BE CONSIDERED. A RECENT ARTICLE IN THE GLOBE AND MAIL BY MR. TOM AXWORTHY (ALSO AVAILABLE) SPELLS OUT WHAT CANADA WILL HAVE TO DO TO BECOME INFLUENTIAL IN WASHINGTON. INCLUDED ON THE LIST ARE INCREASED DEFENCE SPENDING AND IMPROVEMENTS IN MILITARY CAPABILITIES. COMING FROM A FORMER TOP AIDE IN A LIBERAL GOVERNMENT. THIS IS ADVICE WHICH OUGHT TO CAPTURE THE ATTENTION OF THE PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE.

IN OUR LATEST CDA STUDY WE EXAMINE CHANGE AND THE INTERNATIONAL MILIEU. WE IDENTIFY INSTABILITY AND DIVERSITY OF THREATS AS PRIMARY FEATURES OF THE GEOSTRATEGIC SITUATION. WHAT EMERGES IS THAT OLD FASHIONED COMPETITION FOR POWER AMONG STATES HAS ONLY BEEN TEMPORARILY OVERSHADOWED BY THE MORE FASHIONABLE LIST OF ASYMMETRIC THREATS, OFTEN RELATED TO THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN SECURITY.

WE ALSO EXAMINE THE INCREASING IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, LEADING TO THE CONDITION SOMEONE HAS CHRISTENED, EVERYTHING EVERYWHERE, OR PLACELESSNESS. – THAT IS, REDUCTION OR REMOVAL OF PREVIOUS BARRIERS RELATED TO TIME AND SPACE. OUR CONCLUSION IS THAT IT IS STILL VITAL FOR A NATION OF CANADA'S STANDING TO MAINTAIN REASONABLY SUFFICIENT, MODERN, COMBAT CAPABLE ARMED FORCES. THEY MUST BE SUFFICIENTLY STRONG AND FLEXIBLE TO CONDUCT A VERY WIDE VARIETY OF COMBAT, PEACE SUPPORT AND HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS.

IN THE SECOND PART OF THE STUDY WE FOCUS ON CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THE FIRST POINT WE MAKE IS THAT CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL TRADE IS THE LIFE BLOOD OF THE NATION. SOME 70 PERCENT OF OUR GDP RELIES ON TRADE – A MUCH HIGHER PERCENTAGE THAN OTHER LEADING INDUSTRIAL NATIONS OF THE G-7 GROUP. MOREOVER, SOME 86 PER CENT OF OUR FOREIGN TRADE IS WITH THE UNITED STATES. COMBINED WITH A HUGE NATIONAL DEBT AND A WEAK DOLLAR THIS MEANS THAT CANADA'S CURRENT PROSPERITY IS FRAGILE – DESPITE ASSURANCES TO THE CONTRARY BY THE MINISTER OF FINANCE. THE CURRENT SLOW DOWN IN THE US ECONOMY, COMBINED WITH ESCALATING ENERGY PRICES ARE FACTORS THAT COULD IMPACT IN A NEGATIVE WAY ON CANADA.

THE BEST WAY TO FOSTER OUR TRADE RELATIONS IS TO ASSIST THE UNITED STATES AND OUR OTHER ALLIES IN NATO AND ELSEWHERE TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND STABILITY WORLDWIDE. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF WAYS TO DO THIS, BUT I SUGGEST THE FUNDAMENTAL FACTOR IS POLITICAL WILL TO COMMIT EFFECTIVE ARMED FORCES TO BUILD THE FRAMEWORK THAT IS NECESSARY BEFORE OTHER MEANS, SUCH AS NGO AID OPERATIONS, CAN BE APPLIED.

OUR STUDY WAS AIMED AT SHOWING CANADIANS THE SIMPLE LOGIC IN THIS EQUATION: THAT INVESTMENT IN DEFENCE ASSURES CONTINUATION OF THEIR PROSPERITY THROUGH ASSURING STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, SO AS TO ALLOW TRADE TO FLOURISH.

IT IS MY VIEW THAT CANADIAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY SHOULD CONTINUE TO PROCEED FROM THIS SIMPLE AND BASIC PREMISE.

A Force Structure for the 21st Century

IN ANOTHER CDA DOCUMENT, A STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT, (ALSO AVAILABLE ON OUR WEBSITE) WE PROPOSED A FORCE STRUCTURE TO RESPOND TO THE EMERGING SITUATION I HAVE JUST DISCUSSED. THE CURRENT CANADIAN FORCES STRUCTURE IS STILL MUCH THE SAME AS WHAT EXISTED DURING THE COLD WAR ,AND WORSE, IS IN A WEAKER STATE DUE TO UNDERFUNDING.

WE PROPOSE A JOINT FORCE STRUCTURE OPERATING WITHIN A THREE PHASED CONCEPT:  RAPID REACTION

 REINFORCEMENT

 RESTORATION

WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK BOTH REGULAR AND RESERVE UNITS WOULD CONTRIBUTE CAPABILITIES.

ONCE AGAIN, NONE OF THIS WILL WORK UNLESS FUNDING IS PROVIDED TO RAISE MANPOWER LEVELS, ACQUIRE NEW EQUIPMENT AND IMPOSE THE STABILITY NECESSARY TO INTRODUCE AND TRAIN UNDER NEW DOCTRINE.

Conclusion

IN CONCLUSION, I REFER ONCE AGAIN TO THE OPTIONS I STATED IN THE BEGINNING. IN MY VIEW, THE PROGRAM REVIEW OPTION IS NOT AN OPTION AT ALL. IT IS AN ONGOING ACTIVITY AND IT PERPETUATES THE CYCLE OF DECLINE OF CAPABILITIES WE HAVE WITNESSED FOR OVER A DECADE. IT EMBODIES IMPLEMENTATION OF SO-CALLED DESPERATION OPTIONS. UNFORTUNATELY, IT SEEMS TO BE IN FAVOUR AT NDHQ (DUE TO SERIOUS UNDERFUNDING, NOTED BY THE AUDITOR-GENERAL) AND IS OCCURRING AS I SPEAK. RECENT COMMENTS ABOUT BASE CLOSURES AND INTEGRATING OUR FORCES WITH THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES ALSO IDEAS BEING FLOATED.

FOR THE OTHER TWO OPTIONS – REITERATING THE 1994 WHITE PAPER, OR PUBLISHING A NEW ONE – A GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT TO ADEQUATE FUNDING IN ADVANCE IS A COMMON AND FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENT. TO DO OTHERWISE IS SIMPLY TO PUT THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE, AS WE HAVE BEEN DOING FOR SOME THIRTY YEARS IN CANADA.

IF THIS CAVEAT WERE ACCEPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT, I COULD SUPPORT A DEFENCE REVIEW AND A NEW WHITE PAPER, WHICH WOULD BRING TOGETHER THE STRONG POINTS OF THE EXISTING DOCUMENT AS WELL THOSE IN STRATEGY 2020. THE FALLBACK POSITION WOULD BE SIMPLY TO PROPERLY FUND THE 1994 POLICY. CONSIDERING THE POLITICAL CLIMATE HERE AND IN THE UNITED STATES, THIS MIGHT BE THE MOST SIMPLE AND PRACTICAL SOLUTION IN THE SHORT TERM. AT LEAST IT WOULD FOLLOW THE ADVICE OF TOM AXWORTHY, AND WOULD PROBABLY BE MOST ATTRACTIVE TO THE PRESENT GOVRNMENT. IT WOULD SHOW OUR US PARTNER AND OUR MAIN ALLIES THAT THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT IS AGAIN TAKING DEFENCE SERIOUSLY.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION.

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