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Land Force Reserve Restructuring

The Infantry Message

(July 1999)

GOAL:

Retain a viable combat ready Reserve Infantry that will contribute to the depth, flexibility and cost-effectiveness of Canada’s Army and defence capabilities.

 

OBJECTIVES:
bulletReverse the massive re-rolling proposed for the Reserve Army to retain a viable Reserve infantry.
bulletEnsure that Reserve Army restructuring produces an Infantry that is efficient and sustainable, and can contribute effectively to Canada’s defence.

 

 

BACKGROUND:

In 1994 senior Regular Force Army planners, under pressure from global events and shrinking defence budgets, sought restructure the Reserves. At the time, the proposal was to reduce the strength of Canada’s 136 Militia units by eliminating one-half of the existing Militia units or by reducing the existing units to half strength.

Later that year the Minister of Defence directed Army planners and representatives of the Canadian Reserve community to consult with each other in order to reconcile opposing points of view and come forward with a viable plan for the Militia. The Reserve Structure Working Group (SWG) was formed as a result of the Minister’s direction.

In April, 1999, a proposal was offered by the SWG that called for the elimination of 39 Canadian Militia units and a massive shift in emphasis from combat arms to more than 60 per cent service support. It is the opinion of many that the proposed structure and the concepts behind it will seriously restrict Canada’s ability to act as a responsible member of the international community. Many believe the structure will lead to the demise of the Canadian Militia.

 

 

ISSUES:

  1. Re-rolling of 2,019 Reserve infantry positions (from effective strength of 5,439) to service support roles.
  1. Difference between DND reserve structure proposal and the position of representatives of Canada’s Reserve Army (Reserves 2000).
  2. Opinion that the proposed Army Reserve re-structuring will be the demise of Canada’s Reserve Infantry.
  1. Failure to recognize the value and utility of the current Reserve Infantry.

 

KEY MESSAGES:

1. Reserve Army must retain a general-purpose combat capability.
bulletA general-purpose combat capable Army that includes Militia Light Infantry Battalions with multi-role capability is effective, easy to deploy, simple in structure and inexpensive to equip.
bulletA well-trained, motivated pool of combat capable reservists is a flexible, cost-effective way to augment Regular Force for roles in domestic and foreign operations. UN operations have and continue to draw on Reserve augmentation, primarily from Militia infantry units.
bulletCurrent Reserve Army structure and strength are in line with the number of soldiers in the Regular Army and satisfy the recommendation of the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserve that called for Reserve brigades to be composed of a number of Militia Infantry units.

 

2. Reserve Infantry attracts and retains committed volunteer soldiers:
bulletReserve Infantry units attract the most recruits, retain the largest number of its soldiers and provide a significant and valuable source of recruits for the Regular Force.
bulletInfantry trade courses are on average shorter than support trades, which suits volunteer soldiers who must juggle competing interests on their valuable time.

 

 

 

 

  1. Reserve Infantry is a modern, cost-efficient and effective resource for

augmenting Canada’s national and international defence requirements.
bulletMilitia Light Infantry units require minimal support such as vehicles, weapons and other equipment. In the field infantry soldiers are self-sufficient and require very little additional support.
bulletReserve infantry are a committed, motivated front-line resource.
bulletMilitia Infantry utilize modern techniques, training, equipment's, structures and quality of life initiatives that make them an effective force for employment alongside Regular Infantry.

 

  1. Shift of the Reserve Armies primary focus to service support is costly, impractical and unsustainable.
bulletService support training is on average longer and more costly than infantry training.
bulletService support role is of limited and questionable appeal to citizen volunteers who are the Reserve Army. This has a significant potential to limit recruitment and thereby impact on the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed restructuring plan. On the other hand the Infantry offers the broader appeal, challenging training and a chance to serve on operations both which contribute towards recruitment.
bulletMassive re-roling to the service support roles will cause significant defection from the Infantry Reserve ranks, with the potential to adversely affect the Army’s ability to achieve mobilization stages one and two.

 

5. Value and Utility of the Militia Infantry. 5. Value and Utility of the Militia Infantry.
bulletMilitia Infantry by their inherent capabilities are able to conduct a wide variety of tasks for domestic operations i.e. search, floods, ice storms, forest fires and other local disasters.
bulletMilitia infantry provide an essential augmentation force for the Regular Force in the conduct of UN and other international peace keeping and peace restoration operations.
bulletMilitia infantry form the basis on which the country retains a regional capability to mobilize, train and deploy the Canadian Army. The Infantry has and will always bear the highest casualty rates in active operations, therefore it is imprudent to reduce the core structure on which Infantry reinforcements and replacements must be mobilized and trained?

 

6. Consequences of restructuring proposal are more than angst about lost tradition. 6. Consequences of restructuring proposal are more than angst about lost tradition.
bulletShift to more than 60 percent service support function and massive re-roling of infantry positions will negatively impact recruitment and retention of Army Reserve members, leading to demise of the Army Reserve.
bulletDemise of the Army Reserve will have significant repercussions on Canadian Forces domestic and international capabilities.
bulletEmphasis away from combat arms to service support is out of step with public desire to strengthen front-line service and reduce levels of administration and bureaucracy.